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Re: [Cfrg] Efficient side channel resistance for X25519..

"Riad S. Wahby" <rsw@jfet.org> Sat, 09 November 2019 19:07 UTC

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Date: Sat, 09 Nov 2019 11:07:05 -0800
From: "Riad S. Wahby" <rsw@jfet.org>
To: Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@hallambaker.com>
Cc: cfrg@irtf.org
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Efficient side channel resistance for X25519..
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Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@hallambaker.com> wrote:
> I can make the code work but I am not a number theorist so if anyone could
> help, I would appreciate it.

This is more like a vague memory than a clear answer (sorry):

In Mike Hamburg's Decaf paper (https://ia.cr/2015/673), Appx. B
describes a method of recovering the y-coordinate while avoiding
an extra square-root computation, essentially by remembering some
intermediate values during the ladder computation.

I haven't thought at all about whether a similar trick can be used
in the non-Decaf context, but it might be worth taking a look.

(As a general comment---and from your email, it appears we're in
agreement---masking via randomization is good, but probably it's
best to think of it as insurance: a masked implementation that's
non-constant-time is toast in the face of randomness failures.)

-=rsw

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