Re: [Cfrg] I-D Action: draft-irtf-cfrg-xmss-hash-based-signatures-09.txt

"A. Huelsing" <ietf@huelsing.net> Thu, 30 March 2017 13:48 UTC

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From: "A. Huelsing" <ietf@huelsing.net>
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Date: Thu, 30 Mar 2017 15:42:25 +0200
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] I-D Action: draft-irtf-cfrg-xmss-hash-based-signatures-09.txt
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Hi,

we fixed some typos that we were made aware of. No semantics are changed.

Best

Andreas

Am 30-03-17 um 15:33 schrieb internet-drafts@ietf.org:
> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
> This draft is a work item of the Crypto Forum of the IETF.
>
>         Title           : XMSS: Extended Hash-Based Signatures
>         Authors         : Andreas Huelsing
>                           Denis Butin
>                           Stefan-Lukas Gazdag
>                           Aziz Mohaisen
> 	Filename        : draft-irtf-cfrg-xmss-hash-based-signatures-09.txt
> 	Pages           : 67
> 	Date            : 2017-03-30
>
> Abstract:
>    This note describes the eXtended Merkle Signature Scheme (XMSS), a
>    hash-based digital signature system.  It follows existing
>    descriptions in scientific literature.  The note specifies the WOTS+
>    one-time signature scheme, a single-tree (XMSS) and a multi-tree
>    variant (XMSS^MT) of XMSS.  Both variants use WOTS+ as a main
>    building block.  XMSS provides cryptographic digital signatures
>    without relying on the conjectured hardness of mathematical problems.
>    Instead, it is proven that it only relies on the properties of
>    cryptographic hash functions.  XMSS provides strong security
>    guarantees and is even secure when the collision resistance of the
>    underlying hash function is broken.  It is suitable for compact
>    implementations, relatively simple to implement, and naturally
>    resists side-channel attacks.  Unlike most other signature systems,
>    hash-based signatures can withstand attacks using quantum computers.
>
>
> The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-irtf-cfrg-xmss-hash-based-signatures/
>
> There are also htmlized versions available at:
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-xmss-hash-based-signatures-09
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-xmss-hash-based-signatures-09
>
> A diff from the previous version is available at:
> https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-irtf-cfrg-xmss-hash-based-signatures-09
>
>
> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
>
> Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
>
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