Re: [Cfrg] What crypto algorithm is referenced most in RFCs?

Jon Callas <jon@callas.org> Mon, 20 June 2011 17:51 UTC

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From: Jon Callas <jon@callas.org>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] What crypto algorithm is referenced most in RFCs?
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On Jun 20, 2011, at 10:38 AM, Marshall Eubanks wrote:

> On this topic, has triple DES been deprecated yet ? I wouldn't feel comfortable recommending it for something new, but I don't think it's been shown the door yet.

No. 112-bit crypto of all sorts (another example is 2K RSA keys) is still acceptable.

I agree with you, I wouldn't use 3DES for anything new. But the major reason to avoid it isn't key size, it's block size. You should avoid anything with a smaller block than 128 bits.

	Jon



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