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Re: [Cfrg] Security proofs v DH backdoors

Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> Mon, 31 October 2016 09:53 UTC

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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: Antonio Sanso <asanso@adobe.com>
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] Security proofs v DH backdoors
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Date: Mon, 31 Oct 2016 09:53:15 +0000
Message-ID: <1477907594195.4382@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
References: <20161025131014.5709905.2866.6563@blackberry.com> <20161025133016.GA9081@LK-Perkele-V2.elisa-laajakaista.fi> <1477456366629.49872@cs.auckland.ac.nz> <44595.1477524032@eng-mail01.juniper.net> <20161027103214.5709905.11728.6650@blackberry.com> <20161027125120.4d260334@pc1> <1477647359860.49982@cs.auckland.ac.nz> <CAEseHRpN94UWT+rPUbyxsZp8ToKYQR=3=Qn0qt_Kdn27Y6iwxg@mail.gmail.com> <1477824996551.98206@cs.auckland.ac.nz>, <CAEseHRqMXBN7MbZh53Rc_zNncG1OHKXHJYoNOFW0kAYoYBbDkw@mail.gmail.com> <1477905238437.70578@cs.auckland.ac.nz>, <1F1950F9-CCEE-476E-B776-57B3D6297279@adobe.com>
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Cc: CFRG <cfrg@irtf.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Security proofs v DH backdoors
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Antonio Sanso <asanso@adobe.com> writes:

>isn’t this a consequence of the reuse of GCM n-once rather than ECC fault?

Well, the RNG affects k so that affects ECC, and it affects the nonce so it
affects GCM integrity and confidentiality.  Fault once, fail everywhere.

Peter.

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