Re: [Cfrg] Adoption of draft-ladd-spake2 as a RG document

On Dec 17, 2014 3:17 PM, "Paul Lambert" <paul@marvell.com> wrote:
>
>
> ]
> ]On 15/12/14 11:16, Yoav Nir wrote:
> ]> But I would really like to know who needs a PAKE right now. PAKEs
> ]> require the server to store the cleartext password or a password
> ]> equivalent, creating a security issue that is potentially worse than
> ]> sending cleartext passwords through authenticated channels (as in
> ]> form-based or basic authentication to a TLS-protected server)
> ]
> ]+many - PAKEs are IMO cool but mostly-useless crypto for exactly
> ]this reason (and before others disagree, yes, I know some folks
> ]disagree:-) If however, CFRG folk want to work on 'em I've no objection
> ]but just so you all know, there is no horde of IETFers waiting with
> ]bated breath for more PAKE protocol options.
>
> Yes there is ... The Wi-Fi industry needs a stable, open and broadly published version of the SAE protocol.  Approval of the previously discussed draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-05 would meet this need. Yes, it's not favored by some for the perceptions associated with the difficulty of construction of mathematically proof's for the protocols.  Yes, Dragonfly is on a track to get wired into products and it would be very nice to have an open, concise and free (versus IEEE 802) specification of this one type of PAKE.

I don't want to open up a dead horse, but:

Why can't the Wifi alliance publish it's own spec? Anyone implementing
Wifi has to pay for specs for the rest: not clear to me why this is
that special, or why we are the goto group for publishing this. This
doesn't seem to be a relevant consideration for us, since we deal with
IETF protocols.  Furthermore, draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-05 went
through last call a few months ago: it's no longer an issue, and I
don't see why this draft has anything to do with that draft.

>
> While more stylish and acceptable by mathematicians, I see little value in SPAKE2.  In this context I agree with your comment.  There is not a good reason to create new applications of PAKE.  There are better systems solutions where effort would be better spent.

So, we're going to get rid of passwords in five years for the nth time?

The effort of publishing does nothing to solve problems: implementing
does. But when the only PAKE that works over ECC that is
standardized/in an RFC, isn't very well understood, implementors will
reach for it instead of potentially more analysed schemes. Insofar as
we need a PAKE, it would be a good idea to get one in which we have
confidence in the security. It's true that PAKEs have seen limited
adoption compared to plain passwords, but there are many applications
outside of the realm of IETF protocols that have used them.

Furthermore, there is an augmented variant Dan Boneh calls PAKE2+. I
am going to track it down, and it will partially resolve the issue of
servers storing password equivalents. Currently there is no good
reference for it.

Sincerely,
Watson Ladd
>
>
> Paul
>
> ]
> ]There are to be fair a quite small number of sensible people who do
> ]figure there's a niche there to fill though (Dan H. for example but not
> ]sure who else), so I could of course be wrong about that.
> ]As I understand it, the niche Dan has in mind is for signing up to get a
> ]certificate in a PKI, where the password is used to authenticate the
> ]certificate request. Even in that case, I'm not convinced that PAKEs add
> ]value - esp since a one (or limited) time use password could be better
> ]there and requires no new crypto.
> ]
> ]It's also fair to say that the IETF hasn't ever done any kind of generic
> ]consensus call on the (lack of) value of PAKEs, and the IETF does have a
> ]history of adding PAKE options to protocols, (for some to me
> ]unfathomable reason:-) so the above is just my personal opinion.
> ]
> ]S.
> ]
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