Re: [Cfrg] [MASSMAIL]Re: Big-key cryptography

This is not always true. See, for example, McGrew article http://eprint.iacr.org/2012/623/ This is obvously the case of no reseeding in block cipher-based RBGs.
Regards,
Grigory Marshalko,
expert,
Technical committee for standardisation "Cryptography and security mechanisms" (ТC 26)
www.tc26.ru
15 декабря 2015 г., 15:59, "Hanno Böck" <hanno@hboeck.de> написал:
> On Sat, 12 Dec 2015 18:20:35 +0000
> "Grigory Marshalko" <marshalko_gb@tc26.ru> wrote:
> 
>> I mean that when we speak about key generation we should always
>> control the amount of entropy. So the bigger the key the more entropy
>> we need. That is the main problem in this approach - how to generate
>> the initial key/state (By pool I mean entropy pool like in Fortuna
>> RBG).
> 
> This is just wrong.
> 
> If you have once initialized your RNG with a proper seed (128 bits is
> enough, 256 is already pretty much overkill) you have all the entropy
> you need for the rest of your live as long as your PRNG is reasonably
> properly designed.
> 
> The idea of having to re-seed your RNG is very pervasive, but it's
> outright nonsense. There is no need to do something like this. If there
> would be that would implicitly mean the function you're using for your
> PRNG is broken.
> 
> --
> Hanno Böck
> http://hboeck.de
> 
> mail/jabber: hanno@hboeck.de
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> 
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