[Cfrg] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-harkins-pkex-00.txt

Dan Harkins <dharkins@lounge.org> Mon, 12 September 2016 09:19 UTC

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From: Dan Harkins <dharkins@lounge.org>
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Subject: [Cfrg] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-harkins-pkex-00.txt
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   Hello,

   In the current PAKE requirements draft there is an application
described for which we have no candidate protocols. Namely,

  "In addition to key retrieval from escrow, there is also the variant
   of two parties exchanging public keys using a PAKE in lieu of
   certificates.  In this variant, public keys can be encrypted using a
   password.  Authentication key distribution can be performed because
   each side knows the private key associated with its unencrypted
   public key and can also decrypt the peer's public key.  This
   technique can be used to transform a short, one-time code into a
   long-term public key."

So I have written an I-D that proposes just such a protocol. I
solicit review and criticism.

   regards,

   Dan.

-------- Forwarded Message --------
A new version of I-D, draft-harkins-pkex-00.txt

has been successfully submitted by Dan Harkins and posted to the
IETF repository.

Name:		draft-harkins-pkex
Revision:	00
Title:		PKEX
Document date:	2016-09-12
Group:		Individual Submission
Pages:		9
URL:            https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-harkins-pkex-00.txt
Status:         https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-harkins-pkex/
Htmlized:       https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-harkins-pkex-00


Abstract:
    This memo describes a password-authenticated protocol to allow two
    devices to exchange "raw" (uncertified) public keys and establish
    trust that the keys belong to their respective identities.

                                                                                   


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