### Re: [CFRG] Second RGLC on draft-irtf-cfrg-pairing-friendly-curves

Rene Struik <rstruik.ext@gmail.com> Wed, 08 September 2021 19:26 UTC

Return-Path: <rstruik.ext@gmail.com>

X-Original-To: cfrg@ietfa.amsl.com

Delivered-To: cfrg@ietfa.amsl.com

Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id A3D563A3404
for <cfrg@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 8 Sep 2021 12:26:30 -0700 (PDT)

X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com

X-Spam-Flag: NO

X-Spam-Score: -2.098

X-Spam-Level:

X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.098 tagged_above=-999 required=5
tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1,
DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001,
HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, NICE_REPLY_A=-0.001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001,
SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001]
autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no

Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key)
header.d=gmail.com

Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44])
by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
with ESMTP id jEVHzrCTJ-p9 for <cfrg@ietfa.amsl.com>;
Wed, 8 Sep 2021 12:26:24 -0700 (PDT)

Received: from mail-qt1-x836.google.com (mail-qt1-x836.google.com
[IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::836])
(using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits))
(No client certificate requested)
by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C69363A3407
for <cfrg@irtf.org>; Wed, 8 Sep 2021 12:26:23 -0700 (PDT)

Received: by mail-qt1-x836.google.com with SMTP id t35so2893558qtc.6
for <cfrg@irtf.org>; Wed, 08 Sep 2021 12:26:23 -0700 (PDT)

DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20210112;
h=to:cc:references:from:subject:message-id:date:user-agent
:mime-version:in-reply-to:content-language;
bh=r9jibM6beqAb+yA27TjfVTAawwStt1IJvGr8GeuOk5Y=;
b=od1P3mORYdSl7V2CmNtqUe4T+yMePxn7+2ODOwhiRm+IyYcLYU6p6uAypct3gciuJ1
bhDSOEUxXIrHop7RCs+N4UCr1GSZkgSbfgaQgMyPLNdVP82q+og7PUdtjrQ8c0LMpAZW
VQ/vZ10cdqJjPmB8FwyLY2N9H6YxyyypWtFlVdZacM1QmRLWTRxVcBIpRkk1m6x5NnGN
FJJKMNjWxQGsMYzCcPx3oIqruEzWhziHeKAQM3zYfNXB4Tk0d0jyQW8G8qm0tRTMkVym
xy5xW5Y+k7VbdxMeQ/8YuXAchVmkXhExprxBfuAc+iBLx1NmnhRO3Uoeg2pzEFbw/20x
jXVQ==

X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed;
d=1e100.net; s=20210112;
h=x-gm-message-state:to:cc:references:from:subject:message-id:date
:user-agent:mime-version:in-reply-to:content-language;
bh=r9jibM6beqAb+yA27TjfVTAawwStt1IJvGr8GeuOk5Y=;
b=tD4xNLP8Cc21qsmfhuedebL7Fi/Ae3bFS2Lps6Qlbp9Cv071dqphO5h5zmvsy0ft/V
FNwMkfnBDELKqBsuB9cMZ9zhAk7nt8Blu8ivYW83tCK8VnBpWbEPGC+FXCmPkeRmnRGW
S4kGMNKgVwuXgajCWiu0CWv1GftEunw/NFwSW6rkjKkIxpgS0SppW5XOPHYJzRuEeiZ+
AC7WwkkP66se4qqtWUB/y+FMlvyULF1JDpeRgCu0ldaldpo0Neh1bH/LK2+42o68yb9y
5gPoGBpVOv2pGkGmOXZ3w2t6Ch71ZrWc+6UMEWyKXaBTHUUy0mF4NEcDkyiWTC9pS26T
MqWw==

X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM533Ij3AYjEHZQ5aNcpx+dcnvE3dLXx9YxYXjQlBFrSJpj/oYWITl
y7AC5w5odDguQK+Wktz59I8=

X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJxbN6iJkJ40HX631HAI8pnA6SI7y164pqstB7JbtMmS1H8BFyUUTSatCMYEThVOgVbccMLXxQ==

X-Received: by 2002:ac8:5f0b:: with SMTP id x11mr5278626qta.95.1631129180206;
Wed, 08 Sep 2021 12:26:20 -0700 (PDT)

Received: from ?IPv6:2607:fea8:8a0:1397:89c2:9fff:3d99:c0f2?
([2607:fea8:8a0:1397:89c2:9fff:3d99:c0f2])
by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id a22sm2160003qtw.59.2021.09.08.12.26.18
(version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 bits=128/128);
Wed, 08 Sep 2021 12:26:19 -0700 (PDT)

To: "Stanislav V. Smyshlyaev" <smyshsv@gmail.com>, CFRG <cfrg@irtf.org>

Cc: cfrg-chairs@ietf.org

References: <CAMr0u6kV-YsAuAMRh6OVArhZ6DftZSCumqYNOQQ5BWq0cgxW3Q@mail.gmail.com>

From: Rene Struik <rstruik.ext@gmail.com>

Message-ID: <bfe50e38-47da-c639-c154-2606c54ffeeb@gmail.com>

Date: Wed, 8 Sep 2021 15:26:16 -0400

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:78.0) Gecko/20100101
Thunderbird/78.14.0

MIME-Version: 1.0

In-Reply-To: <CAMr0u6kV-YsAuAMRh6OVArhZ6DftZSCumqYNOQQ5BWq0cgxW3Q@mail.gmail.com>

Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="------------2920DB2FA6CFA993234C9334"

Content-Language: en-US

Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/cfrg/H6KhyNAxXSerD0rkA0PTrNGH1ec>

X-Mailman-Approved-At: Thu, 09 Sep 2021 06:55:18 -0700

Subject: Re: [CFRG] Second RGLC on draft-irtf-cfrg-pairing-friendly-curves

X-BeenThere: cfrg@irtf.org

X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29

Precedence: list

List-Id: Crypto Forum Research Group <cfrg.irtf.org>

List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.irtf.org/mailman/options/cfrg>,
<mailto:cfrg-request@irtf.org?subject=unsubscribe>

List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/cfrg/>

List-Post: <mailto:cfrg@irtf.org>

List-Help: <mailto:cfrg-request@irtf.org?subject=help>

List-Subscribe: <https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg>,
<mailto:cfrg-request@irtf.org?subject=subscribe>

X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 08 Sep 2021 19:26:31 -0000

Review of draft-irtf-cfrg-pairing-friendly-curves-10 (July 30, 2021) Reviewer: Rene Struik Assessment: again, not ready (final ditch or serious rewrite -- see "How further?" (i) or (ii) below.) Note: page numbers in this review refer to rev-10 Remark (no review of rev-09 by me): The authors posted draft-irtf-cfrg-pairing-friendly-curves-9 (Nov 16, 2021), five days after I posted my review of rev-08 to the CFRG mailing list. They subsequently posted draft-irtf-cfrg-pairing-friendly-curves-10 (July 30, 2021), just prior to the CFRG meeting during IETF-111. Since the rev-09 draft was posted very close in time to my rev-08 review comments and did not yet include consideration of my rev-08 comments, I did not do another review at the time. The current review does consider what transpired to the draft since my earlier reviews on the rev-07 and rev-08 drafts (posted on Sun July 12, 2020 and Wed Nov 11, 2020, respectively). While the review is relative to rev-10, I briefly summarize my perception of what changed between rev-08, rev-09, and rev-10 of the draft. Summary of (my perspective on) changes to the draft since rev-08: a) rev-09 (posted Nov 16, 2021) seems to be a very minor update of rev-08 (25 lines changed/added [4]), mostly now including some verbiage as to which pairing-friendly curves the authors recommend. b) rev-10 (posted July 30, 2021) again seems to be a slight update of rev-09 (96 lines changed/added [5]), mostly confined to more consistent curve naming (instead of using, e.g., both BLS12_381 and BLS12-381 to refer to the same object) and some small editorial changes to Appendices A, A.1, and A.2 (related to optimal Ate pairing description). General meta remarks: a) I posted earlier reviews of rev-07 and rev-08 drafts (copied at end of this rev-10 review). From past revisions (rev7 --> rev10) it is clear that those earlier reviews have not led to too much change at all (over the course of more than a year). Main problem here is that this is not really a conversation: There has hardly been (or is) any technical discussion on the CFRG mailing list, suggesting a very low energy level on this topic. Main interaction has been some tiny updates of a draft over a long time period, where the hope may have been for earlier reviewers to throw in the towel and get to the exit. I have seen some "blanket" support by one or two, but without any evidence that this support stems from a careful review of the draft at hand (since not accompanied by a single editorial or technical suggestion). While it is nice to support an area with potentially interesting applications (as I also do), this is (in my opinion) somewhat meaningless without considering and reviewing whether this same enthusiasm should also applies to offered details. b) In my mind, quite a few comments articulated in my earlier reviews still stand (which are not repeated below). Nevertheless, just by considering rev-10, I noticed more technical questions that I did not already include in my previous reviews, e.g., regarding underspecification (see Details #3), and incompatible representation ideas between different CFRG drafts (see Details #1, #2), or the underlying philosophy (Details, #4). Moreover, field representations do not follow the representations in [7] the draft suggests (see Details #5). How further? I my mind, there are two possible next steps for this document: i) ditch the draft (at some point, "enough is enough"); ii) narrow down the draft and make this into something that fits an IRTF group. This could, e.g., include --- description of G1, G2, GT, and mapping e: G1 x G2 --> GT (conceptual/mathematical); --- highlighting some motivating example (e.g., informally describe signing using pairing map, e.g., if repr: msg --> G1 map available, M:=repr(msg), Q2:=d*BP2, and S:=d*M, then e(d*M,BP2)=e(M,d*BP2)=e(M,Q2)). This would also make it clear why having a hash-to-curve function would fit into this space (link with hash-to-curve draft). --- discuss which quadruples (G1, G2, GT, e) are "good", in terms of (a) efficiency; (b) cryptographic security; (c) implementation security; --- describe how to represent all of this (bit/octet/field/curve conversions, etc.) in a non-adhoc way. --- remove all advertising, marketing material, tables for table-sake, conflation of availability of libraries, actual use, etc. Note RS: right now, I hardly see any discussion hinting at why, e.g., t with low-Hamming weight helps (a); only "some" discussion re exTNFS (b); virtually "no" discussion re (c), even though already mentioned in my rev-07 review. From Detailed comments below it seems representation details are also lacking detail and consistency. This should all be fixed. NOTE: I could have rewritten the entire draft along the above lines (ii), but - frankly - this is not my project. I am willing to help, but have hopefully already done so by the three reviews so far (no matter the lack of uptake). This could still be turned-around if the will to do so is there (where this could get the shape (ii) above within a few months of spare cycles outside normal work). The choice is yours and the group's. Detailed comments: 1) Appendix C, p. 49: The sign function sign_GF_p is defined differently from the sgn0 function in the hash-to-curve draft (see [6], Section 4.1), where in the first case this is set to 1 if the value is in the interval [(p+1)/2,p-1] and to 0 otherwise, while in the second case it is set to the parity bit (i.e., mod 2 value) of its representation as integer in the interval [0,p). Moreover, the sign function sign_GF_p^2 for quadratic extension fields is defined "from-right-to-left" in this draft, whereas this is defined "from-left-to-right" in the hash-to-curve draft [6] (if one assumes polynomial coefficients to be ordered in increasing index order). {As an aside, the notation should probably read sign_GF(p) and sign_GF(p^2).} This seems to unnecessary complicate applications that may wish to use both drafts (such as BLS signatures). 2) Appendix C, p. 49, Section 2.5, p. 10: Elements of a non-trivial extension field GF(p^m) are represented using a "towering fields" construction, which is generally different from (and inconsistent to) the representation of extension fields in the hash-to-curve draft (see [6], Section 2.1) {which uses a polynomial construction as GF(p^m):=GF(p)[x]/(f(x)), with f(x) a polynomial of degree m}. This seems to unnecessary complicate applications that may wish to use both drafts (such as BLS signatures). 3) Section 4.2.1, p 18: The domain parameters for BLS12_381 seem underspecified: while the towering fields construction for GF(p^{12}) via GF(p), GF(p^2) = GF(p)[u] / (u^2 + 1), GF(p^6) = GF(p^2)[v] / (v^3 - u - 1), and GF(p^{12}):=GF(p^6)[w]/(w^2-v) allows each field elements of GF(p^{12}) to be expressed as polynomial in GF(p)[u,v,w], where variables are from {1,u}x{1,v,v^2}x{1,w}, this still leaves lots of wiggle room in picking u, v, and w (these are not unique, e.g., f(u):=u^2+1 has two roots, viz. u and -u:=u^p, etc.). In this particular case, this may lead to ambiguity in representation of elements of GF(p^{12}) and ambiguity in the Ate pairing result (here, 12 isomorphic choices) if these picks are not specified. The same remark applies to other domain parameters, such as with BN462 (Section 4.2.2) and BLS48_581 (Section 4.3). This may also lead to ambiguity of point compression and decompression processes (Appendix C). 4) Section 4.1, p. 13, first para leaves out pairing-friendly curves with sub-128-bit security "due to space limitations", but then - puzzlingly - adds those back in Appendix D (presumably, since "useful information for implementers"). What is the point of including in this draft parameter sets that do not make the post-exTNFS cut? This raises a more general philiosophical point what the primary purpose of this draft is: from Sections 4.2.1, 4.2.2, and 4.3, it seems the main point is to define BN462, BLS12_381, and BLS48_581 as suitable pairing-based constructs, whereas Table 1, collateral info, and, e.g., the abstract suggest more of a survey objective, and lots of company and library naming suggests highlighting toolkits and industry players who have put a foot into this area over the last 20 years. It would help the reader to be more clear about objectives. 5) Section 2.5, p. 9: representation of finite fields is suggested to follow conventions in [7], but does not: in [7], finite field elements are represented using polynomial construction conventions with highest-order index first ordering (see [7], Appendix B), and not a towering field construction. Editorial comments: 1) Section 2.1, p. 6, 1st para: the requirement that the discriminant Delta:= 4*a^3+27*b^2 of short-Weierstrass curve W_{a,b} is nonzero holds in GF(q) and not in the ring of integers modulo q (these notions are different if q:=p^m and m>1). 2) The rev10 draft uses BLS12_381 to refer to the pairing-friendly curve that is denoted as BLS12-381 (i.e. differently) in the hash-to-curve draft [6]. 3) Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 indicate the domain parameters being specified in their title, while Section 4.3 (which specifies BLS48_581) does not. 4) Section 5 (Security Considerations), p. 26, 2nd para, l. 2: the group G_3 (image of pairing map) is commonly called (also elsewhere in the draft) G_T. 5) Appendix A, p. 35, 2nd para: the affine coordinates of Q1 should read (x_1, y_1), rather than (x_1, x_2). (Not sure why one needs the "underscore" notation instead of simply writing x1, y1, x2, y2, etc.) Note: unfortunately, this shows that, even with very small changes from the rev-09 to the rev-10 draft, errors can still easily creep in... 6) References, pp. 27-35: the references to the hash-to-curve draft [6] (April 13, 2021), the lwig-curve-representations draft [7], and the bls-signature draft [8] all need updating (since refer to old drafts); almost all normative references seem misclassified (since informational); lots of informal references refer to blogs, github pages, and company websites (thereby, calling into question longevity, stability, and technical nature of content); some references lack sufficient detail (e.g., the [ECRYPT] reference is undated; the [NIST] leaves out versioning info [supposedly Revision 5]); there seems to be a severe case of "reference stuffing", where it is unclear whether this supports or hampers the audience of the draft to appreciate its message(s). As an aside, the [SG] reference is to IACR ePrint 2018/193 (instead of 2019/193); the link to BLS12_381 in [ZCashRep] is broken. 7) Acknowledgements, p. 27: I don't think there is a need to categorize comments as received from "expert reviewers" and those received from others. To my knowledge, CFRG is no caste system and comments received from, e.g., Crypto Review panel members, do not carry any more weight than those received from others. {This should not need to be stated, if disposition of feedback on reviews on previous versions of the draft had not included suggestions as if there were such a "pecking order" in place.} Ref: [4] https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url1=draft-irtf-cfrg-pairing-friendly-curves-08&url2=draft-irtf-cfrg-pairing-friendly-curves-09 [5] https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url1=draft-irtf-cfrg-pairing-friendly-curves-09&url2=draft-irtf-cfrg-pairing-friendly-curves-10 [6] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve-11 (April 13, 2021) [7] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-lwig-curve-representations-21 (June 9, 2021) [8] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-bls-signature-04 (September 10, 2020) [review posted to CFRG mailing list: Wed Nov 11, 2020, 5.10pm EST (first para below posted 8.12pm EST)] Review of draft-irtf-cfrg-pairing-friendly-curves-08 (Sep 9, 2021) Reviewer: Rene Struik Assessment: again, not ready (perhaps, ditch?) Note: page numbers in this review refer to rev-08 One more note: except for RFC 2119 and RFC 8174, none of the normative references are, in fact, normative (since, e.g., referring to a conference paper). Whether all 7 pages of informative references are informative is in the eye of the beholder (it does hike up quotation numbers, though). General comments: 1) It seems that at least half of my main technical comments (apart from editorials) with my review of the rev-07 draft have not been addressed. Moreover, it is somewhat hard to get back to the authors on the mailing list, since they buried their comment resolutions in a somewhat nebulous github structure. This makes it a little bit hard to get enthusiastic about doing yet another review. 2) It seems that the authors have not done any effort to disentangle technical specification, availability of libraries, and actual deployment (see my comment #01 of my rev07 review), where there still is a somewhat misleading tilt due to equating all these disparate things and where there is still an unusual prominence of company names, etc. Perhaps, some of this can be taken care of by including a section with "implementation status" (which disappears once this becomes an RFC), as other IETF drafts have done. Nevertheless, this would fly in the face of selection policies for pairing-based curves which are based on conflated notions. This begs the question what the purpose of this draft is. 3) The draft, as it stands, still contains lots of material that is in a state with much to be desired for. As an example, Appendix A contains quite a few errors (Ate pairing) and lacks sufficient explanatory context and Appendix C is such an adhoc hack that (I feel) this should never be endorsed by CFRG. For details, see some of my comments on rev08 (where I did focus on the appendices). 4) It may be best if CFRG ditches this document, since it still seems far off from being a useful document, written clearly so as to educate the CFRG and the wider IETF community. (Given the lack of feedback on this document over time, perhaps nobody would care.). Should CFRG still wish to give this draft a chance to become a CFRG-issued RFC, I believe it needs a major rewrite to get rid of nontechnical spin material. I also think it would be beneficial not to have yet more specifications come up with their own representations and procedures where there is no real technical justification for this. Should the authors wish to push this "as is", they could always pursue the "independent stream" for this (where one could argue that nothing can be changed). If this should be pushed furthr, I can imagine a slim draft, without umpteen tables and zillions of references, where one simply provides domain parameters and explains how mappings work without all the ads for libraries and start-up companies with non-empty github pages. For some detailed technical and editorial comments, see below. (I have more comments, but I think the below suffices to show this is far from ready.) I know this is not what authors want to hear and does not make me popular, but so be it. Detailed comments: 1) Appendix A: the description of the so-called line function is very unclear for non-pairing people (which I presume is most of the CFRG), where expressing this in a style resembling elliptic curve notation more would certainly help. Some suggestions: express the line function as Line_function(P1,P2,Q), where P1:=(x1,y1) and P2:=(x2,y2) are affine points of G2 (curve defined over GF(p^2)) and where Q:=(X,Y) is an affine point of G1 (curve defined over GF(p)), mapping to subgroup G_T of GF(p^k)^*. This allows expressing the number l if P1=P2 as l:=lambda:=(3*x1^2+a)/(2*y1), which is familiar in point doubling formulas for short-Weierstrass curves (where, here, domain parm a is zero) and, similarly, if P1<> (+/-) P2, as l:=lambda:=(y2-y1)/(x2-x1) (see, e.g., [3]). Here, it would also help explaining what happens in case of non-affine inputs (point-at-infinity) and why the output would be an element of the prime-order multiplicative subgroup G_T of GF(p^k)^*. 2) Appendix A, last para before A.1: one should mentions the image of the point-at-infinity under this Frobenius map. 3) Appendix A.1: this section seems to be full of ambiguities and errors: (a) should one assume the parameter t is the same as the one definining the prime p, etc.? (if so, please say so); (b) write c:=c0+c1*2+ ... + c_{L}*2^{L} and explain that c_L is nonzero and that the Ate pairing procedure works no matter the choice of the coefficients in the range {-1,0,1} (if not, much explanation is needed, since, e.g., c=0+1=2-1 may have different results; (c) fix the loop to "for i:=L-1 downto 0"; (d) replace the silly "|" language in the if condition "c_i=1 | c_i=-1" by "c_i nonzero" (you are writing this for humans, not for parsers); (d) the Line_function has three arguments, but in the call Line_function(T, ci*Q) it only has two: should this include P as third argument?; (e) how does one know the line function never receives non-affine points as input?; (f) the line with frobenius maps seems to compute Q1:=frob(Q); Q2:=frob(Q1) and, if so, doesn't one get Q2=frob(frob(Q))=Q since Q is a point of G2 and, thereby a point of a curve defined over GF(p^2)? 4) Appendix A.1: how does one know that f is never the zero element 0 (if so, it is not in GF(p^k)*)? 5) Appendix A.1: the Ate pairing seems to use integer c written in NAF-notation. If so, shouldn't one at least say something about side channels, in case the inputs or outputs of the Ate pairing are non-public parameters? What about the huge final exponentiation in GF(p^k)^*, where the exponent h:=(p^k-1)/r has an enormous size (~ p^{k-1})? (Note RS: I did ask about side-channels in my review of the rev07-draft [rev07-comment #10], but that comment was never addressed.) 6) Appendix A.2: the beginning of that section is virtually the same as Appendix A.1's, but misses some language (e.g., on "sum of (i=0,1,...,L)" --> equals c, order r --> of G1, etc. Remarks on some of the steps of the listed procedure similar to those with Appendix A.1 apply. 7) Appendix A would benefit from a much better explanation of the role of the Ate pairing in pairing-based crypto. Otherwise, this seems just loose sand, without context. (If the goal is to educate the CFRG audience about coolness of pairing-based crypto, why not provide sufficient detail to raise interest?; otherwise, why pursuing this draft?) 8) Appendix B: the relationship between elements of GF(p^k) and the output sequences (e_0,...,e_{11}), resp. (e_0,...,e_{47}) is not described in sufficient detail. 9) Appendix C: this appendix is so poorly written and the construction so adhoc that this should be abandoned right away (see also my previous comment in my rev-07 draft review (rev07-comments#21/#22). Here, simply observe that this point encoding only works for BLS12-381 and not for, e.g., BN462, purely because of poor design choices made. Please also see Note 2 of Appendix I.8 of draft-ietf-lwig-curve-representations-13 (which describes SEC1 representations, but now for any field of odd characteristic). Simply using the SEC1-encoding, where one squeezes-in the 1-octet identifier for affine points (0x04), point-at-infinity (0x00), and compressed y-coordinate (0x02 or 0x03) in the leftmost 2 bits of the tight MSB/msb-order representation of elements of GF(p), where the bit-length of p has two fixed bit positions for BLS12-381 and BN462 case does the job. 10) Appendix C: while I think this appendix should be ditched right away and replaced by a more systematic approach that, in principle, applies to all pairing-based curve domain parameters (see prevous comment), there are also some problems with the text itself, including (a) the high-level remarks are confusing and do not seem to contain any useful information, so might easily be removed; (b) The I2OSP and OS2IP functions in RFC 8017 do describe integer-to-octet-string and octet-string-to-integer conversions, but do not specify the bit-ordering (which is needed to describe the encoding of integers as bit-strings and vice-versa); (c) Step 2 (in Appendix C.1) seems to confuse specification and implementation (since seemingly aimed at machines rather than humans); (d) Step 3 (in Appendix C.1) seems to suggest that an element x=x0 + u*x1 of GF(p^2) is represented in the order "highest coefficient first", whereas in Section 2.5 this seems to be in the order "lowest coefficient first" (although this is hard to figure out due to the recursive definition in terms of towers of fields) - it is hard to figure out what "see discussion of vector representation above" refers to, since there does not seem to have been one; (e) Step 8 (in Appendix C.2) may result in output P:=(x,-y), where the second coordinate is a negative integer (and, thereby, not in the interval [0,p)). Editorial comments: 1) Appendix A, last para before A.1: this para refers to Barreto-Naehrig curves and should be moved to the beginning of Appendix A.1. 2) Appendix A, last para before A.1: why not expressing the Frobenius map in a more human-friendly way, e.g., frob(x,y):=(x^p,y^p), where one leaves the parameter p implicit? 3) Appendix B, l. 8: in "where u is a indeterminate", change "a" to "an". 4) Appendix B, l. 8: check for consistent naming of BLS48-581, etc. (underscore vs. dash language). Also elsewhere. BTW - it would help to add the curve name to section headings to make these easier to find, e.g., adding BLS12_381 to the title of Section 4.2.1, etc. 5) Appendix C, p. 49: replace "sign_F_p" by "sign_GF(p)", etc. 6) Section 4.2.1, last para: I am not sure what adding the new (in rev08) advertisement for another cfrg draft (hash-to-curve) adds to this document, since it seems to be just PR, without any context. Shouldn't one shy away from cross-marketing? Ref: [3] D. Hankerson, A. Menezes, S. Vanstone, Guide to ECC, Springer, 2003. [review posted to CFRG mailing list: Sun July 12, 2020, 7.07pm EDT] Review of draft-irtf-cfrg-pairing-friendly-curves-07 (June 18, 2020) Reviewer: Rene Struik Assessment: not ready Summary: The draft provides domain parameters for a few curves used with pairing-based cryptography and provides some test vectors. General remarks: a) While the draft suggests multiple times that the exTNFS attack (2016) negatively impacted the bit-security level of various proposed domain parameter sets for pairing-based curves, it does not provide any detail on this attack itself, nor any reassurances that potential extensions of these (only 4-yr old!) attacks on the general discrete logarithm problem of composite degree extension fields GF(p^t) for small composite t>1 would not be in the cards. This diminishes trust in the claimed security of these curves and their "fitness for use" in practice. the only use of these attacks is simply providing lengthy tables with claimed revised security levels. Why should one have confidence in this, do advances in solving the DLP in small degree extension fields provide the kiss of death for pairings (or if not: why not?), etc? b) The draft has 6 1/2 pages of references and 3 1/2 pages of tables of "adopted parameters" on a total of 27 pages of main body text. It seems one should be able to considerably prune both tables and references (which now come across as unwieldy). A good starting point may be to consider that availability of a library or standardization does not necessarily imply that schemes are actually deployed. c) It is unclear what motivated change in co-authorship of this draft, e.g., when considering changes between rev04 and rev07 of this draft. It seems more customary to credit minor contributions in the acknowledgement section than by change of authorship. d) Lots of specification details seems adhoc and even motivated by a particular company's conventions. For CFRG, it may be more appopriate to specify curves, finite fields, and objects that live herein, in a more systematic way, rather than reinventing the wheel, thereby fostering reuse and maintainability. e) I am curious why this draft's intended status is "experimental" (vs. "informational", as is far more common for IRTF documents). Detailed comments: 1) Section 1.2 (and also elsewhere) seems to conflate standardization of parameters, availability of libraries, and actual deployment, where there is an unusual prominence (for an IRTF document) of company names. Wouldn't it make more sense to describe potential applications of pairing based cryptography in more technical terms, e.g., in terms of facilitating aggregate signatures, remote attestation, etc., and provide a brief description (and a technical reference)? 2) Section 1.3: the main point of the extTNFS attack is that it tries and solve the DLP in low-degree extension field GF(p^t) for small composite t>1 faster. To bring this point accross, I suggest changing reference to "by the attack" (l. 5 of Section 1.3) by something more closely reflecting this. 3) Section 2.3, 4th para (top of p. 8): elaborate on the "BN curves always have order 6 twists" remark (this seemed to have been copied ad verbatim from the [BD18] paper). 4) Section 2.4, 4th para: it would be good to mention that parameter t must be 1 (mod 3), since otherwise p is not an integer. 5) Section 2.5: the representation conventions are highly confusing, esp. for extension fields. Why not define everything in terms of a prime field GF(p) and extension field GF(p^t), with fixed irreducible polynomial f(z) of degree t over GF(p)? This has been successfully used with elliptic curve specifications (NIST, ISO, ANSI, BSI) not tailored to pairing based crypto. This would also avoids questions that now immediately come up (such as whether defining GF(p^{d'}) in terms of GF(p^{d}) and "inductively applying the above convention" does yield an unambigous definition. Since all finite fields of fixed size are isomorphic, it would be much easier to stick to the standard way of doing this. This would also avoid messy tower of extension field arguments and messy representations of elements hereof (e.g., in Section 4.4). See also Appendix J on data conversions of the lwig draft referenced in this draft. As final note, the data conversions in that lwig draft require specifying bit/octet encodings (which, in the pairing case, seem to be most-significant-byte-first (MSB) and most-significant-bit-first (msb). 6) Section 3.1, 4th para: it is unclear what the meaning of "best known" is: is this "best-known" (i.e., most well-known) or "simply the best"? Given the description, the first meaning should be the correct one... 7) Section 3.2: what is missing is a section that actually describes the attack, rather than simply plugging in some implied numbers based on a paper (presumably [BD18]). Why not add some verbiage that explains this in simple but roughly accurate terms ("The exTNFS Attack", or, better, "Attacks on DLP over Low-Degree Extension Fields", or even better, "Solving the DLP in Finite Fields" (there has been lots of progress there for mid-size base fields too)). This is a CFRG document, so one would expect something that provides insight, rather than simply a bombardment of tables, some selection criteria, and a filtered list. Wouldn't the objective of this whole effort be to educate the CFRG audience on pairing-based crypto, rather than (say, obtaining an RFC number from an SDO and marketing this as an implied "authoritative" approval stamp)? 8) Section 3.2: I remember that Francisco Rodriguez-Henriquez (fix name in references) presented attacks at the CHES 2013 rump sessions, where question was whether this spelled trouble for pairing-based crypto. While I do not have his presentation then on file, it may be good to dig this up or ask him, and contemplate on wider implications of DLP progress in general (see also first general review remark). 9) Section 3.2, 2nd para: A natural question is what one could say about DLP complexity for GF(p^k), in terms of dependency on p and k. Unfortunately, this section does not provide any insight on this (it only provides a single numerical value for BLS48 curves, without any context). I would suspect the reader audience would appreciate such insight, without need to wed through a whole forest (6 1/2 pages: far too much reference stuffing!) of references by himself without any guidance as to whether this would be time well-spent or lost. 10) Section 4: as stated before, the selection criteria seem somewhat arbitrary, since conflate specification text, libraries, with actual deployment. Moreover, the most important criteria should probably be security and speed given particular security strength, and potential support for finite field arithmetic on platforms (speaking of which: why not devote a section on whether one can actually implement GF(p^k) securely using finite field libraries, including modular reductions, side channels, etc.?). The term "adoption status" seems, in any event, misleading. 11) Section 4.1, Table on pp. 12-15: if one strikes out domain parms rendered immediately suspect by the exTNFS paper on DLP, this kills off 8 out of 10 entries on p. 12 (and far more if one stikes out suspect values accross the entire table). This makes me wonder what the technical reason is for including this entire table. To the casual reader it now suggests that there are huge numbers of implementations out there, whereas - perhaps - most of those should be switched off immediately... 12) Section 4.1.2: once again, I am wondering why there is so much emphasis on libraries here. Isn't this an IRTF/CFRG document? 13) Section 4.2.1: The extension field GF(p^{12}) can also be described via GF(p) and degree-12 polynomial f(w):=(w^6-1)^2+1. This would allow using simple conventions used in Lidl et al's finite field book [2]. It also allows description of an element x of GF(p^{12}) as vector (x_{11}, ..., x_1, x_0) of coefficients of GF(p) with this irreducible polynomial. Note here that u+1:=w^6 and v:=w^2, so one can easily internally use the more complex tower field stuff in the draft, while sticking to simple and easy to maintain standard constructions (known for 2 centuries) for specifications (so, nobody looses out if one has a slim interface that does this conversion back and forth, if necessary). 14) Section 4.2.1, bottom of p. 18: shouldn't the cofactor h be such that h*r= # E'(GF(p^2))? {please also fix Et and use E' notation as elsewhere in the draft} 15) Section 4.2.1, parameter b' (bottom of p. 19): if one uses the complicated tower construction, why then not also mention the value of u in the enumeration? Is one actually sure this value is uniquely defined (e.g., I did not check but wondered what would happen if one replaces u by -u in the tower construction)? Same with end of Section 4.2.2... 16) Section 4.2.2, 5th para: the statement "CP8_544 is more efficient" is hard to interpret without context (e.g., half the cost, cost-1, cost - o(log log log n)). 17) Section 4.2.2, bottom of p. 20: with parms BN462, why not simply introduce base point G, parameter n, h, etc., once and for all in Section 2.1, without trying to repeat their definition in Section 4.2.2 (and later sections)? 18) Section 4.2.2, top of p. 21: the formula for h seems incorrect (G2 is defined over GF(p^2), whereas the formula refers to a curve defined over GF(p^8). 19) The security consideration section (Section 5) is rather slim: (speculation on my side) is the reason to label this draft as "experimental" that design strength vs. actual strength is somewhat in limbo due to progress on DLP problem? Why suddenly squeeze in a point validation routine if no context is given at all of where and how pairing based crypto is used? Wit point validation, what if an octet representation is outside GF(p) boundary? (while the forelast para seems to imply an attack one is completely left in the dark what is at stake here). Not sure whether it is the role of CFRG documents to legitimize "BN254 use ... to keep interoperability". The end of the first para ("as of 2020, as far as we know, there are no fatal attacks that significantly reduce the security of pairing-friendly curves after exTNFS") is entirely non-reassuring to me: it is only four years after the DLP attack that necessitated to strike out half of the entries in the table earlier on in the paper, not that many people work on pairing-based algorithmic cryptanalysis in the first place, etc., etc. Where does this confidence come from (shouldn't one be more modest here, technically speaking???). The Cheon attack is not explained and cannot be evaluated at all, since no context on elliptic arithmetic is given at all in the draft. 20) Secion 5, 3rd-last para: Why would the Montgomery ladder suddenly come to the rescue to salvage side channel resistance? Why refer to RFC 7748: whereas pairing-friendly curves are all Weierstrass curves, the curves in RFC 7748 are all Montgomery curves with completely different underlying detail on differential-addition chains). It seems that an entire section should be devoted to how implementations coul avoid SCA attacks, esp. since some operations take place in huge extension fields GF(p^t)... 21) Appendix C seems to convey a particular encoding used by ZCash. I don't think it is the role of CFRG to make those the standard way of doing things. This being said, technically that representation is a tiny tweak of what the SECG1 specification already stipulated in 2001 (with SEC1, one can extract the affine/compressed encoding of an affine point and whether this relates to the point at infinity from the leftmost octet (0x04, 0x02 or 0x03, vs. 0x00), which more or less 1-1 corresponds to the (C_bit, I_bit, S_bit) combinations. If so, reinventing yet another representation is hard to defend. 22) The parity bit notation for finite fields is highly non-standard, compared to, e.g., what has been standard usage with compressed points for curves over prime fields or binary extension fields. Even if this would have some uses, why not defining things once and for all for all extension fields of an odd prime field, so that this is a simple extension. See also Appendix H (parity function for any field GF(p^k), where p odd). This should also help in limiting side channel leakage from the first-half vs. last-half of [0,p-1] test. Editorial comments: 1) Section 2.1, first para: replace "F_q" by GF(q), stipulate that extension degree n>0. 2) Section 2.1, first para: with defining equation, use more common domain parameters a and b (i.e., lowercase instead of upper case). Elsewhere, do use common nomenclature used with NIST, ANSI, SECG, ISO for 2 decades, including n for prime-order subgroup, h for co-factor, mention irreducible polynomial f(z) with extension field, denote fixed base point by P (instead of BP), etc. If one wishes, refer to Appendix B.1 of [1]. 3) Section 2.1, 2nd para: "point on" should be "point of". 4) Section 2.1, first/3rd para: isn't it simpler to define curve over GF(q) and then introduce curve with same domain parms, but then defined over extension field GF(q^k)? 5) Section 2.1, 3rd para: "group law which" should be "group law that", "reflection about x-axis" should be "reflection around x-axis", with "unique third point of intersection [R]" (i.e., give this a name, here R), with [a]P, stipulate that [0]P is the identity element and that [-a]P=-([a]P), etc. 6) Section 2.1, terminology: fix E(F_{q^k}) (i.e., add paranthesis), fix that this refers to GF(q^k)-rational points (rather than GF(q)-rational points, same with cardinalities. 7) Section 2.1, terminology: with co-factor h, doesn't one need gcd(h,n)=1 (so, as to ensure unique order-n subgroup)? 8) Sectioon 2.2, 2nd para "is called embedding degree of E over GF(q)" (i.e., add curve and field over which this is defined) 9) Section 2.2, 2nd para: the term "twist" is not defined (but often used elsewhere in the draft), neither is the term GF(p^k)* (nonzero elements of GF(p^k). 10) Section 2.3, 2nd para: replace "prime p" by "prime number p (where p at least five)". 11) Section 2.3, 3rd para (top of p. 8): write "the multiplicative group..." or, better still, simply state that b is a primitive element of GF(p) (and add this to terminology). 12) Section 2.4, 4th para: "parameterized" should read "parameters". 13) Section 3.1, 3rd para: "paiting-based" should be "pairing-based" (i.e., fix the typo "t" --> "r"). 14) Section 3.1, 4th para: "to solve" should read "for solving". 15) Section 3.2, 1st para: "the security level(s)" (i.e., make plural), "... correspond" (i.e., use corresponding verb conjugation). 16) Section 4.2, 2nd para: reword "more prudent option" as "more conservative option". 17) Section 4.2.1, 4th para: "categorized as M-type" ("as" instead of "into"). Ref: [1] draft-ietf-lwig-curve-representations-10 [2] R. Lidl, Niederreiter, "Finite Fields", Cambridge University Press, ...On 2021-08-13 11:38 a.m., Stanislav V. Smyshlyaev wrote: > Dear CFRG participants, > > This message starts a second RGLC on "Pairing-Friendly Curves" > (draft-irtf-cfrg-pairing-friendly-curves-10), that will end on > September, 8th. > > See > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-irtf-cfrg-pairing-friendly-curves/ > <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-irtf-cfrg-pairing-friendly-curves/> > for the latest version of the draft. > > We are having the second RGLC since Yumi Sakemi has provided (see > https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/cfrg/-1nTbbVRlkP5wV2odEYFac-jK08/ > <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/cfrg/-1nTbbVRlkP5wV2odEYFac-jK08/>) > updated replies for the questions raised after the first RGLC. > > Please send your comments, as well as expression of support to publish > as an RFC (or possible reasons for not doing so) in reply to this > message or directly to CFRG chairs. > > Regards, > Stanislav, Nick and Alexey > > _______________________________________________ > CFRG mailing list > CFRG@irtf.org > https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg -- email: rstruik.ext@gmail.com | Skype: rstruik cell: +1 (647) 867-5658 | US: +1 (415) 287-3867

- [CFRG] Second RGLC on draft-irtf-cfrg-pairing-fri… Stanislav V. Smyshlyaev
- Re: [CFRG] Second RGLC on draft-irtf-cfrg-pairing… Michael Scott
- Re: [CFRG] Second RGLC on draft-irtf-cfrg-pairing… Colin Perkins
- Re: [CFRG] Second RGLC on draft-irtf-cfrg-pairing… Yumi Sakemi
- Re: [CFRG] Second RGLC on draft-irtf-cfrg-pairing… Yumi Sakemi
- Re: [CFRG] Second RGLC on draft-irtf-cfrg-pairing… Rene Struik
- Re: [CFRG] Second RGLC on draft-irtf-cfrg-pairing… Watson Ladd
- Re: [CFRG] Second RGLC on draft-irtf-cfrg-pairing… Yumi Sakemi
- Re: [CFRG] Second RGLC on draft-irtf-cfrg-pairing… Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL
- Re: [CFRG] Second RGLC on draft-irtf-cfrg-pairing… Riad S. Wahby
- Re: [CFRG] Second RGLC on draft-irtf-cfrg-pairing… Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL
- Re: [CFRG] Second RGLC on draft-irtf-cfrg-pairing… Watson Ladd
- Re: [CFRG] Second RGLC on draft-irtf-cfrg-pairing… Peter Gutmann
- Re: [CFRG] Second RGLC on draft-irtf-cfrg-pairing… Yumi Sakemi