Re: [Cfrg] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-harkins-pkex-00.txt

Dan Harkins <dharkins@lounge.org> Mon, 12 September 2016 20:19 UTC

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To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
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From: Dan Harkins <dharkins@lounge.org>
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Date: Mon, 12 Sep 2016 13:19:03 -0700
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-harkins-pkex-00.txt
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   Hi Andy,

On 9/12/16 8:20 AM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>
> This appears to be more or less the same protocol described in the 
> 802.11 DPP drafts.  It was terminally insecure then and it appears to 
> be just as terminally insecure now.  If it's really necessary for some 
> reason, I can reiterate the multiple ways I found to break it after 
> half an hour of thinking.
>

Yes please do show the multiple ways to break this.

> This protocol needs to be replaced, starting from scratch.  By "from 
> scratch", I mean that a real PAKE should be used, in its intended 
> form.  The result will not even need to mention "groups", because 
> there is no reason at all for the tiny bit of protocol layered above 
> the PAKE to care that the exchanged keys are anything other than 
> opaque strings.
>

   I am honestly soliciting constructive comments. If you have some
please provide them.

   Dan.

> --Andy
>
>
> On Sep 12, 2016 2:19 AM, "Dan Harkins" <dharkins@lounge.org 
> <mailto:dharkins@lounge.org>> wrote:
>
>
>       Hello,
>
>       In the current PAKE requirements draft there is an application
>     described for which we have no candidate protocols. Namely,
>
>       "In addition to key retrieval from escrow, there is also the variant
>        of two parties exchanging public keys using a PAKE in lieu of
>        certificates.  In this variant, public keys can be encrypted using a
>        password.  Authentication key distribution can be performed because
>        each side knows the private key associated with its unencrypted
>        public key and can also decrypt the peer's public key.  This
>        technique can be used to transform a short, one-time code into a
>        long-term public key."
>
>     So I have written an I-D that proposes just such a protocol. I
>     solicit review and criticism.
>
>       regards,
>
>       Dan.
>
>     -------- Forwarded Message --------
>     A new version of I-D, draft-harkins-pkex-00.txt
>
>     has been successfully submitted by Dan Harkins and posted to the
>     IETF repository.
>
>     Name:		draft-harkins-pkex
>     Revision:	00
>     Title:		PKEX
>     Document date:	2016-09-12
>     Group:		Individual Submission
>     Pages:		9
>     URL:https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-harkins-pkex-00.txt
>     <https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-harkins-pkex-00.txt>
>     Status:https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-harkins-pkex/
>     <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-harkins-pkex/>
>     Htmlized:https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-harkins-pkex-00
>     <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-harkins-pkex-00>
>
>
>     Abstract:
>         This memo describes a password-authenticated protocol to allow two
>         devices to exchange "raw" (uncertified) public keys and establish
>         trust that the keys belong to their respective identities.
>
>                                                                                        
>
>
>     Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
>     until the htmlized version and diff are available attools.ietf.org <http://tools.ietf.org>.
>
>     The IETF Secretariat
>
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