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 <CAF4450C-C421-43EF-A3E5-978E129B1D09@live.warwick.ac.uk>
In-Reply-To: <CAF4450C-C421-43EF-A3E5-978E129B1D09@live.warwick.ac.uk>
From: "Stanislav V. Smyshlyaev" <smyshsv@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 20 Nov 2019 19:12:24 +0800
Message-ID: <CAMr0u6msuLCsmM=G7Grm3+GDhPxva1aEEUZi7S581oO=cKVubQ@mail.gmail.com>
To: "Hao, Feng" <Feng.Hao@warwick.ac.uk>
Cc: CFRG <cfrg@irtf.org>
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/cfrg/JGCKLYxaDN_dd8-3IoSFdKUHyxo>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] A question to be added to the Round 2 questions list for
 nominated PAKEs (about SPAKE2)
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Dear Feng,

Of course, any modifications of the protocols can only be provided only
together with updated security proofs (that need additional verification,
of course) - it was mentioned in my previous message.

Regards,
Stanislav

=D1=81=D1=80, 20 =D0=BD=D0=BE=D1=8F=D0=B1. 2019 =D0=B3. =D0=B2 18:52, Hao, =
Feng <Feng.Hao@warwick.ac.uk>:

> Hi,
>
>
>
> I=E2=80=99m not involved in the panel review, but the following is my per=
sonal
> observation.
>
>
>
> It seems to me that this standardization process is tangled with modifyin=
g
> protocols and fixing issues as they arise along the way. The changes rais=
ed
> below are not anything trivial. As we should all know well, designing a
> cryptographic protocol is extremely delicate and error-prone =E2=80=93 it=
 often
> takes several years of public scrutiny to uncover flaws; even for protoco=
ls
> that are =E2=80=9Cprovably secure=E2=80=9D, the proofs may contain errors=
 or invalid
> assumptions, which can also take several years for them to be discovered.
> If a protocol is to be considered for standardization, first of all, it
> should really need to be =E2=80=9Ccompletely=E2=80=9D specified, and =E2=
=80=9Cfixed=E2=80=9D (no movable
> parts). Then, give plenty time for public scrutiny and time for maturity.
> If no attacks are found, the public confidence on the security on the
> protocol will grow over time. In most cases, designers of a protocol only
> have a chance to get it right =E2=80=93 either at the start or never. All=
owing
> heuristic or retrospective changes would not help increase public
> confidence.
>
>
>
> Cheers,
>
> Feng
>
>
>
> *From: *Cfrg <cfrg-bounces@irtf.org> on behalf of "Stanislav V.
> Smyshlyaev" <smyshsv@gmail.com>
> *Date: *Wednesday, 20 November 2019 at 07:44
> *To: *"cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
> *Subject: *[Cfrg] A question to be added to the Round 2 questions list
> for nominated PAKEs (about SPAKE2)
>
>
>
> Dear CFRG,
>
>
>
> I've just sent two questions to be considered to be added to the Round 2
> questions list, including: "Can you propose a modification of SPAKE2
> (preserving all existing good properties of SPAKE2) with a correspondingl=
y
> updated security proof, addressing the issue of a single discrete log
> relationship necessary for the security of all sessions (e.g., solution
> based on using M=3Dhash2curve(A|B), N=3Dhash2curve(B|A))?"
>
>
>
> We've had a discussion with Dan Harkins about possible improvements of
> SPAKE2 (many thanks to him for such a fruitful discussion!): it seems tha=
t
> the only major issue about SPAKE2 can be solved by using M=3Dhash2curve(A=
|B),
> N=3Dhash2curve(B|A)). It seems that there can't be any additional
> side-channel issues (like occured in Dragonfly), since the proposed
> modification needs only calculations based on publicly available
> information.
>
>
>
> Of course, such a modification requires additional security analysis of
> SPAKE2, modified accordingly.
>
>
>
> Best regards,
>
> Stanislav
>
--=20

=D0=A1 =D1=83=D0=B2=D0=B0=D0=B6=D0=B5=D0=BD=D0=B8=D0=B5=D0=BC,

=D0=A1=D1=82=D0=B0=D0=BD=D0=B8=D1=81=D0=BB=D0=B0=D0=B2 =D0=A1=D0=BC=D1=8B=
=D1=88=D0=BB=D1=8F=D0=B5=D0=B2, =D0=BA.=D1=84.-=D0=BC.=D0=BD.,

=D0=97=D0=B0=D0=BC=D0=B5=D1=81=D1=82=D0=B8=D1=82=D0=B5=D0=BB=D1=8C =D0=B3=
=D0=B5=D0=BD=D0=B5=D1=80=D0=B0=D0=BB=D1=8C=D0=BD=D0=BE=D0=B3=D0=BE =D0=B4=
=D0=B8=D1=80=D0=B5=D0=BA=D1=82=D0=BE=D1=80=D0=B0

=D0=9E=D0=9E=D0=9E =C2=AB=D0=9A=D0=A0=D0=98=D0=9F=D0=A2=D0=9E-=D0=9F=D0=A0=
=D0=9E=C2=BB

--0000000000000474c80597c542a2
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div><div dir=3D"auto">Dear Feng,</div></div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><d=
iv dir=3D"auto">Of course, any modifications of the protocols can only be p=
rovided only together with updated security proofs (that need additional ve=
rification, of course) - it was mentioned in my previous message.</div><div=
 dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto">Regards,</div><div dir=3D"auto">S=
tanislav</div><div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D=
"gmail_attr">=D1=81=D1=80, 20 =D0=BD=D0=BE=D1=8F=D0=B1. 2019 =D0=B3. =D0=B2=
 18:52, Hao, Feng &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:Feng.Hao@warwick.ac.uk">Feng.Hao@wa=
rwick.ac.uk</a>&gt;:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"ma=
rgin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">





<div lang=3D"EN-GB" link=3D"#0563C1" vlink=3D"#954F72">
<div class=3D"m_-3251390488136040105WordSection1">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Hi,<u></u><u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">I=E2=80=99m not involved in the panel review, but th=
e following is my personal observation.<u></u><u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">It seems to me that this standardization process is =
tangled with modifying protocols and fixing issues as they arise along the =
way. The changes raised below are not anything trivial. As we should all kn=
ow well, designing a cryptographic
 protocol is extremely delicate and error-prone =E2=80=93 it often takes se=
veral years of public scrutiny to uncover flaws; even for protocols that ar=
e =E2=80=9Cprovably secure=E2=80=9D, the proofs may contain errors or inval=
id assumptions, which can also take several years for them
 to be discovered. If a protocol is to be considered for standardization, f=
irst of all, it should really need to be =E2=80=9Ccompletely=E2=80=9D speci=
fied, and =E2=80=9Cfixed=E2=80=9D (no movable parts). Then, give plenty tim=
e for public scrutiny and time for maturity. If no attacks are found,
 the public confidence on the security on the protocol will grow over time.=
 In most cases, designers of a protocol only have a chance to get it right =
=E2=80=93 either at the start or never. Allowing heuristic or retrospective=
 changes would not help increase public
 confidence.<u></u><u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Cheers,<u></u><u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Feng<u></u><u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
<div style=3D"border:none;border-top:solid #b5c4df 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0cm =
0cm 0cm">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;color:black">From=
: </span></b><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;color:black">Cfrg &lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:cfrg-bounces@irtf.org" target=3D"_blank">cfrg-bounces@irtf.org</=
a>&gt; on behalf of &quot;Stanislav V. Smyshlyaev&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"mail=
to:smyshsv@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">smyshsv@gmail.com</a>&gt;<br>
<b>Date: </b>Wednesday, 20 November 2019 at 07:44<br>
<b>To: </b>&quot;<a href=3D"mailto:cfrg@irtf.org" target=3D"_blank">cfrg@ir=
tf.org</a>&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:cfrg@irtf.org" target=3D"_blank">cfr=
g@irtf.org</a>&gt;<br>
<b>Subject: </b>[Cfrg] A question to be added to the Round 2 questions list=
 for nominated PAKEs (about SPAKE2)<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Dear CFRG,<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">I&#39;ve just sent two questions to be considered to=
 be added to the Round 2 questions list, including: &quot;Can you propose a=
 modification of SPAKE2 (preserving all existing good properties of SPAKE2)=
 with a correspondingly updated security proof,
 addressing the issue of a single discrete log relationship necessary for t=
he security of all sessions (e.g., solution based on using M=3Dhash2curve(A=
|B), N=3Dhash2curve(B|A))?&quot;<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">We&#39;ve had a discussion with Dan Harkins about po=
ssible improvements of SPAKE2 (many thanks to him for such a fruitful discu=
ssion!): it seems that the only major issue about SPAKE2 can be solved by u=
sing M=3Dhash2curve(A|B), N=3Dhash2curve(B|A)).
 It seems that there can&#39;t be any additional side-channel issues (like =
occured in Dragonfly), since the proposed modification needs only calculati=
ons based on publicly available information.<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Of course, such a modification requires additional s=
ecurity analysis of SPAKE2, modified accordingly.<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Best regards,<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Stanislav<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>

</blockquote></div></div>-- <br><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_signature" =
data-smartmail=3D"gmail_signature"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><=
div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><p><font color=3D"#1f497d">=D0=A1 =D1=83=
=D0=B2=D0=B0=D0=B6=D0=B5=D0=BD=D0=B8=D0=B5=D0=BC,</font></p><p><font color=
=3D"#1f497d">=D0=A1=D1=82=D0=B0=D0=BD=D0=B8=D1=81=D0=BB=D0=B0=D0=B2 =D0=A1=
=D0=BC=D1=8B=D1=88=D0=BB=D1=8F=D0=B5=D0=B2, =D0=BA.=D1=84.-=D0=BC.=D0=BD.,<=
/font></p><p><font color=3D"#1f497d">=D0=97=D0=B0=D0=BC=D0=B5=D1=81=D1=82=
=D0=B8=D1=82=D0=B5=D0=BB=D1=8C =D0=B3=D0=B5=D0=BD=D0=B5=D1=80=D0=B0=D0=BB=
=D1=8C=D0=BD=D0=BE=D0=B3=D0=BE =D0=B4=D0=B8=D1=80=D0=B5=D0=BA=D1=82=D0=BE=
=D1=80=D0=B0</font></p><p><font color=3D"#1f497d">=D0=9E=D0=9E=D0=9E =C2=AB=
=D0=9A=D0=A0=D0=98=D0=9F=D0=A2=D0=9E-=D0=9F=D0=A0=D0=9E=C2=BB</font></p><di=
v><br></div></div></div></div></div></div></div>

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