Re: [Cfrg] General question about ECC encryption

good stuff, below.. sort reminds of OpenBSD the pump there random generators thru a second pass, amongst other things. so modern crypto
standards, more or less 2 different algorithms seem to be the best as any weakness in one is offset by the other. likewise with random generators?

> On Mar 31, 2018, at 6:56 AM, Dan Brown <danibrown@blackberry.com> wrote:
> 
> Many things are possible, see ‎https://ia.cr/2015/1018
> by Koblitz and Menezes, where they examine some speculations about secret attacks on ECC, RSA, etc.
> 
> There was considerable discussion in CFRG, and else where on _which_ ECC is best, but that does not seem to be your question.
> 
> Personal views: based on published info: ECC was in 1985, last attacks on ECDLP in prime fields were from 1999, and affected very special curves, ECC standard since around 2000, ECC now deployed very widely. Of course, one must also be careful how one uses ECC, because there’s many pitfalls.
> 
> It's okay to worry about ECC, but the solution is to use ECC + 2nd algorithm.‎ Refusing ECC passes the buck to another algorithm , e.g RSA, which might also have a secret attack, and has some published deficiencies.
> 
> 
> Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone on the Rogers network.
>  Original Message
> From: N6 Ghost
> Sent: Friday, March 30, 2018 1:31 AM
> To: cfrg@irtf.org
> Subject: [Cfrg] General question about ECC encryption
> 
> 
> Hi all,
> 
> I recently, go into a “talk” with one of the security engineers at work. he was trying to tell me how he refuses to use ECC encryption because it has weakness it there basic functionality.  something about curves being able to be predicted.  and the NSA and other “big brother” orgs, have tools
> the break ECC because of these weaknesses….
> 
> whats the real skinny?
> 
> N6Ghost
> 
> 
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