Re: [CFRG] Attack on a Real World SPAKE2 Implementation

My guess is they got M and N wrong. Ah they got M and N wrong oh and [redacted]... wait they didn't fix [redacted]. This is still broken. OK I guess it's theoretically broken: 5 racks of computers breaks a PAKE exchange on average every 4 days. There's a better method but I don't think it works in this case.

P.S. I sent him an email. So it should be fixed soon.

> On 05/07/2021 2:24 AM Ruben Gonzalez <in+lists@ruben-gonzalez.de> wrote:
> 
>  
> Hello CFRGers,
> 
> this is my first time posting on the mailing list. In case this is the 
> wrong place for such a message, I apologize.
> 
> Aaron Kaiser (in CC) and I wrote a detailed blog post about a 
> vulnerability Aaron found in a real world SPAKE2 implementation.
> 
> The blog post "Croc Full Plaintext Recovery - CVE-2021-31603" can be 
> found here: https://redrocket.club/posts/croc/.
> 
> We did not attack SPAKE2 directly, but a faulty implementation. The blog 
> post might still be relevant for authors of the standard, since it shows 
> how developers can easily misunderstand it.
> 
> For questions or additional information, just drop us an email.
> 
> Kind regards,
> 
> Ruben Gonzalez
> 
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