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Re: [Cfrg] 1024 bit RSA

Derek Atkins <derek@ihtfp.com> Fri, 04 November 2016 16:33 UTC

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From: Derek Atkins <derek@ihtfp.com>
To: Erik Andersen <era@x500.eu>
References: <005a01d236b0$4b247470$e16d5d50$@x500.eu>
Date: Fri, 04 Nov 2016 12:33:46 -0400
In-Reply-To: <005a01d236b0$4b247470$e16d5d50$@x500.eu> (Erik Andersen's message of "Fri, 4 Nov 2016 16:29:54 +0100")
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Cc: Cfrg <cfrg@irtf.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] 1024 bit RSA
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"Erik Andersen" <era@x500.eu> writes:

> I participate in IT smart grid standardization within IEC TC57 WG15. A couple
> of standards under development still allow 1024 bit RSA keys for so-called
> backward compatibility. I have so far not been able to change that. My
> question is now. Is there any information available for how long time or how
> much effort it takes to break  a 1024 bit RSA key?

Just remember that RSA1024 provides approximately 80 bits of security.
As Phill mentioned that's currently out of the range of public
resources, but probably not SIGINT.

What symmetric ciphers are they using?  If they're using AES-128, then I
would ask why they would support a key agreement/signature that's less
secure?  Getting 128-bit public key security is rather straightforward
these days, even in pretty small systems.

> Erik

-derek
-- 
       Derek Atkins                 617-623-3745
       derek@ihtfp.com             www.ihtfp.com
       Computer and Internet Security Consultant

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