Re: [Cfrg] Response to the request to remove CFRG co-chair

Adam Back <> Wed, 08 January 2014 15:17 UTC

Return-Path: <>
Received: from localhost ( []) by (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2BFE41AE409; Wed, 8 Jan 2014 07:17:56 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.9
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.9 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, LOTS_OF_MONEY=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_HELO_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham
Received: from ([]) by localhost ( []) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id Kl1qFb8WhvH9; Wed, 8 Jan 2014 07:17:53 -0800 (PST)
Received: from ( []) by (Postfix) with ESMTP id D73D81AE3EF; Wed, 8 Jan 2014 07:17:52 -0800 (PST)
Received: from netbook ( []) by (node=mrus3) with ESMTP (Nemesis) id 0Lx8qn-1VKtBz2bMX-016ayr; Wed, 08 Jan 2014 10:17:39 -0500
Received: by netbook (Postfix, from userid 1000) id A61572E49E1; Wed, 8 Jan 2014 16:17:28 +0100 (CET)
Received: by flare (hashcash-sendmail, from uid 1000); Wed, 8 Jan 2014 16:17:22 +0100
Date: Wed, 08 Jan 2014 16:17:22 +0100
From: Adam Back <>
To: John Viega <>
Message-ID: <>
References: <> <> <> <> <>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"; format="flowed"
Content-Disposition: inline
In-Reply-To: <>
User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.21 (2010-09-15)
X-Hashcash: 000000000000000000000000BQVa
X-Hashcash: 00000000000000000000000022Rt
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
X-Provags-ID: V02:K0:y38bPDnuWK4VSK3GnzgCDEN6Qcc0IQ5pKCnWYDdIZ11 nCsDCTLl1KaZpNFd7u4fRLjvJBD0N+prmq78sT/u6seOf+31xe yA0cboNAChUkdbSPhpDdK/wtwHRt+QeoCm9nmpTPxLUZdyFmk8 RF/j5b45oue+YcdMCTzSZj90en6QpBAtjvlw1BCqNAJKG4Igga 6/73ZYNXHCBit0VtZ93moaVBwqAs9IMmus9y/SWb9X+RpfoAPa uMoqukd2l6fwFwbLurnTiJiGq3sT7/gD/xH9pD5kgbqwD7C7ip EYAfgOwDYV4Fl0z1yGzpaY0YeoAnJJgtszUFff0OUNQiUMu7r5 LiR5VY4MOtquqxwbSZ2x6G8UfYWL7joDiOuAvjfXU
Cc: Adam Back <>, "" <>, David McGrew <>,, Trevor Perrin <>, IAB IAB <>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Response to the request to remove CFRG co-chair
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15
Precedence: list
List-Id: Crypto Forum Research Group <>
List-Unsubscribe: <>, <>
List-Archive: <>
List-Post: <>
List-Help: <>
List-Subscribe: <>, <>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 08 Jan 2014 15:17:56 -0000

Hi John

I've seen several people putting forward a similar argument.  There is some
logic but its I think an incorrect conclusion.

I understand the conflict of interest when people are somewhat pushing their
companies approach, related to their product or implementtion choices they
have some investment in, but generally tempered by reasonableness.  All the
companies that care can put their voice in also.  IPR disclosures are also
there.  Loose consensus and running code copes with that ok.

I think NSA sabotage is a significantly different and its unrealistic to
just assume a chair has no influence.  A non-NSA chair would strive for
impartiality with regard to their employers interests.  If certicom wants to
push something and cisco something else they are both pushing for something
reasonably secure as a fundamental assumption and trying to make secure
systems so their customers will buy them.  Forward secrecy is good,
architectural weaknesses bad etc.

The NSA is NOT in that boat.  They are explicitly sabotaging security on a
grand and systematic scale at all levels including standardization.  They
dislike forward secrecy, and like architectural weakness and architectural
tap points and sabotaged RNGs, and fragile hard to implement correctly
standards with traps.  There were numerous news articles by Greenwald and
others backed by NSA docs about these strategies.

I suppose I need to go find the declassified military sabotage manual that I
mentioned Ian Grigg quotes from.  You, and others making this argument,
should read and extrapolate (the part is a very short, one page).  "OSS's
Simple Sabotage Field Manual, a 1944 document"

No I am not being paranoid, the journalists have the docs, and they are
publishing the summaries and some of the actual docs, and their technical
analysts supporting them are Schneier & Applebaum.

So again I do not find it acceptable to have an agent of a now known
industrial scale sabateur in a chair position.  Maybe you would feel
different if it were Chinese military intelligence and they were shown via
leaks to have succeeded in backdooring a protocol the world is using, based
on abused good faith in open standards, and say used it to exfiltrate info
from US defense contractors and military, and an openly Chinese MI
affiliated guy was co-chair.  Not sure what triggers people to get it.  Its
ridiculously and egregiously inappropriate from where I am sitting.


(IETF participant since 1996)

On Wed, Jan 08, 2014 at 09:37:36AM -0500, John Viega wrote:
>   I agree with David that competence doesn’t factor into it.
>   Conflict of interest is an issue here.  But again, even before recent
>   NSA revelations, there would often be participants with a conflict—
>   good of the participant’s company vs. good of the world.  Even now,
>   where NSA is part of the threat model, we shouldn’t expect every actor
>   with a conflict is going to walk in with an NSA badge.
>   I don’t think conflict of interest is a good enough basis for removing
>   a chair.  The IETF/IRTF needs to be able to design standards when many
>   actors have conflicts, and should be able to give confidence in what
>   they produce.
>   The most important thing from my perspective is making sure the
>   IETF/IRTF has the public trust.  I think it’s possible to do this
>   without removing Kevin, especially if the IETF/IRTF can clearly
>   communicate how it prevents subversion.
>   That is, if the world cares enough.  I suspect that very few people are
>   going to boycott IETF/IRTF-driven standards if no further action is
>   taken.
>   John
>   John Viega | cel +1 212-321-0902
>   On Jan 8, 2014, at 8:42 AM, Adam Back <[1]> wrote:
>     I support Trevor in raising the conflict of interest, its pretty
>     egregious
>     and Kevin should in my view resign gracefully to end this mess.  If
>     hes
>     clean and works for IA as he says its a nice way out.  If hes not
>     and is
>     actually part of the sabotage side its still a quieter way out than
>     being
>     pushed.  It probably doesnt look as clean either way if he is
>     pushed.  If he
>     is not pushed it just creates bad impression of the impartiality of
>     IRTF. Sort of like the justice system closing ranks and supporting
>     Hoover after
>     the scandal and him staying in office with immunity by analogy.  I
>     am not
>     sure of the game theory from NSA sabotage side, if they would prefer
>     Kevin
>     (whether on their budget or not) to let the noise continue and be
>     pushed or
>     skip the noise and resign, or noise continue, plus fail to push him
>     and
>     continue with the resentment and reputation loss to IRTF.
>     There is some validity in what David said below also.  Some of
>     Kevins stuff
>     looks suspicious to others also, its certainly not just Trevor, but
>     of
>     course its not provable - the worst parts are either innocuously
>     ill-considered/sub-optimal suggestions, as with the next guy prone
>     to human
>     failure (which is somewhat plausible) or designed to be unprovable.
>     $250m/year managed with military intent can achieve that you know,
>     its not
>     hard.  There are unclassified military intelligence double agent
>     sabotge
>     manuals that Ian Grigg posts quotes from now and then that show the
>     basic
>     ideas.  Most of them still seem quite relevant.
>     Anyway the point I wanted to draw from David's comment is we cant
>     and wont
>     be able to prove it.  BUT I think anyone is certainly within their
>     right to
>     comment on things that look suspicious, or insecure.  See I think
>     for
>     comparison the RNG bias Bleichenbacher found in DSA RNG leading to
>     key
>     recovery are fair game.  As is Ferguson et al's comments about
>     EC_DRBG.  Or
>     Trevors about some of the decisions relating to Dragonfly.  Or Prof
>     Bernstein's comments about Kevin's recent post here about certicom
>     patents
>     pushing towards less secure curves (see the crypto list).
>     Its called peer review.  If anyone cant stand their thoughts and
>     public
>     statements being peer reviewed, probably participating in IRTF/IETF
>     or
>     uncensored internet discussion in general is not for them.  As we
>     have
>     pretty incontrovertible proof that NSA has been sabotaging
>     standards,
>     unfortunately that opens up review of input to the standards
>     influenced by
>     any NSA participants.  Its ugly but we didnt create the problem,
>     Kevin's
>     employer did.  Sorry.
>     So unfortunately it is probably relevant that apart from conflict of
>     interest, the public record is not suspicionless.  Imagine NSA /
>     NIST
>     communications about EC DRBG were public.  There'd be a pretty clear
>     public
>     interest to go over the history of it, see who was supporting it or
>     aware of
>     it within NIST.  Its really not that dissimilar.
>     We may in the longer term have to review and even deprecate existing
>     standards as a result of this militarized sabotage of its own and
>     global
>     civilian infrastructure.
>     ps I support Trevor in rejecting Lars assertion that IRTF co-chair
>     has no
>     influence.
>     Adam
>     (IETF participant since 1996).
>     On Wed, Jan 08, 2014 at 07:36:07AM -0500, David McGrew wrote:
>     Hi Trevor,
>     I recognize and support your right to raise the question of a
>     conflict of interest between the NSA and CFRG.  I am confident that
>     the IRTF chair and IAB will give it due consideration.
>     However, I am concerned that your efforts to find evidence in the
>     CFRG email archive that support the idea that Kevin is incompetent
>     are unwarranted and counterproductive.   While many people agree
>     with you about the conflict of interest, many disagree with you on
>     the subject of competence.  It is not hard to go through the email
>     archive and find examples where someone misstated something, or did
>     not explain something completely, but doing so does not advance the
>     security or privacy on the Internet, which is the goal that you and
>     I share for CFRG.  That goal would best be served by focusing the
>     valuable time of the research group members (a scarce resource that
>     we need to manage well) on addressing technical issues.   Therefore,
>     I respectfully ask that, in your request to the IAB, you focus on
>     the key issue of the conflict of interest.
>     David
>     On 01/06/2014 08:48 PM, Trevor Perrin wrote:
>     Hi Lars,
>     Thanks for considering this request.
>     Of course, I'm disappointed with the response.
>     --
>     I brought to your attention Kevin's record of technical mistakes and
>     mismanagement over a two year period, on the major issue he has
>     handled as CFRG co-chair.  You counted this as a single
>     "occurrence",
>     and considered only the narrow question whether it is "of a severity
>     that would warrant an immediate dismissal".
>     I appreciate your desire to be fair to Kevin and give him the
>     benefit
>     of the doubt.  But it would be better to consider what's best for
>     CFRG.  CFRG needs a competent and diligent chair who could lead
>     review
>     of something like Dragonfly to a successful outcome, instead of the
>     debacle it has become.
>     --
>     I also raised a conflict-of-interest concern regarding Kevin's NSA
>     employment.  You considered this from the perspectives of:
>     (A) Kevin's ability to subvert the group's work, and
>     (B) the impact on RG participation.
>     Regarding (A), you assessed that IRTF chairs "are little more than
>     group secretaries" who "do not wield more power over the content of
>     the ongoing work than other research group participants".
>     That's a noble ideal, but in practice it's untrue.  Chairs are
>     responsible for creating agendas, running meetings, deciding when
>     and
>     how to call for consensus, interpreting the consensus, and liaising
>     with other parties.  All this gives them a great deal of power in
>     steering a group's work.
>     You also assessed that the IETF/IRTF's "open processes" are an
>     adequate safeguard against NSA subversion, even by a group chair.
>     I'm
>     not sure of that.  I worry about soft forms of sabotage like making
>     Internet crypto hard to implement securely, and hard to deploy
>     widely;
>     or tipping groups towards dysfunction and ineffectiveness.  Since
>     these are common failure modes for IETF/IRTF crypto activities, I'm
>     not convinced IETF/IRTF process would adequately detect this.
>     Regarding (B), you judged this a "tradeoff" between those who would
>     not participate in an NSA-chaired CFRG (like myself), and those
>     "affiliated with NSA" whom you presume we would "eliminate" from
>     participating.
>     Of course, that's a bogeyman.  No-one wants to prevent anyone else
>     from participating.
>     But the chair role is not a right given to every participant, it's a
>     responsibility given to those we trust.  The IETF/IRTF should not
>     support a chair for any activity X that has a strong interest in
>     sabotaging X.  This isn't a "slippery slope", it's common sense.
>     --
>     Finally, I think Kevin's NSA affiliation, and the recent revelations
>     of NSA sabotage of a crypto standard, raises issues you did not
>     consider.
>     You did not consider the cloud of distrust which will hang over an
>     NSA-chaired CFRG, and over the ideas it endorses.
>     You also did not consider that as the premier Internet standards
>     organization, the IETF/IRTF's actions here will make an unavoidable
>     statement regarding the acceptability of such sabotage.
>     We have the opportunity to send a message that sabotaging crypto
>     standards is unacceptable and destroys public trust in those
>     organizations in a way that has real consequences.  Or we send a
>     message that it's no big deal.
>     This is a political consideration rather than a technical one, but
>     it
>     needs to be considered.  We're sending a message either way.
>     --
>     I understand there's no formal appeal process, but these issues are
>     of
>     great importance to the IRTF and IETF, and would benefit from the
>     perspective IAB possesses.
>     I would appreciate if the IAB would consider reviewing this issue
>     and
>     expressing its judgement.
>     Trevor
>     (a couple comments below)
>     On Sat, Jan 4, 2014 at 11:49 PM, Eggert, Lars <[2]>
>     wrote:
>     Hi,
>     on Dec 20, 2013, I received a request from Trevor Perrin in my role
>     as IRTF Chair to consider the removal of Kevin Igoe as one of the
>     co-chairs of the IRTF's Crypto Forum Research Group (CFRG). The
>     request stated several reasons for the removal:
>     (1) That Kevin Igoe provided the only positive feedback on the
>     "Dragonfly" key exchange protocol.
>     (2) That Kevin Igoe made technical suggestions that would have
>     weakened the cryptographic properties of "Dragonfly".
>     (3) That Kevin Igoe misrepresented the CFRG opinion on "Dragonfly"
>     to the IETF's TLS working group.
>     (4) That Kevin Igoe is employed by the NSA.
>     I have reviewed the mailing list discussion, as well as the emails
>     that were sent privately. Thank you all for being candid in your
>     feedback.
>     David McGrew, the CFRG's other co-chair, has already posted a
>     detailed timeline of events on points 1-3 to the list and concluded
>     that the research group process has been followed imperfectly. I
>     share this conclusion.
>     Dragonfly discussions started in December 2011.  David's timeline
>     begins in October 2012, skipping:
>     * The early critical feedback which Kevin ignored [1]
>     * Kevin's "nitpicking detail" which breaks the protocol's security
>     [2]
>     * Kevin's cheerleading for a protocol whose use cases and
>     alternatives he made no effort to understand [3]
>     [1]
>     [3]
>     [2]
>     [3]
>     [...]
>     So unlike the title "co-chair" might imply, and unlike in many other
>     organizations, IRTF co-chairs are little more than group
>     secretaries.
>     The chair is far more than a "group secretary".  As RFC 2014 section
>     5.3 states:
>     """
>     The Research Group Chair is concerned with making forward progress
>     in
>     the areas under investigation, and has wide discretion in the
>     conduct
>     of Research Group business.  [...] The Chair has ultimate
>     responsibility
>     for ensuring that a Research Group achieves forward progress.
>     """
>     _______________________________________________
>     Cfrg mailing list
>     .
>     _______________________________________________
>     Cfrg mailing list
>     [4]
>     _______________________________________________
>     Cfrg mailing list
>     [5]
>   1.
>   2.
>   3.
>   4.
>   5.

>Cfrg mailing list