Re: [Cfrg] Encrypt in place guidance

"Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL" <uri@ll.mit.edu> Wed, 01 April 2020 16:36 UTC

Return-Path: <prvs=136048fdfc=uri@ll.mit.edu>
X-Original-To: cfrg@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: cfrg@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id ABFB43A12B7 for <cfrg@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 1 Apr 2020 09:36:25 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.619
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.619 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, KHOP_HELO_FCRDNS=0.276, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_NONE=0.001, UNPARSEABLE_RELAY=0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=no autolearn_force=no
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id bKM4dyXCubhD for <cfrg@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 1 Apr 2020 09:36:23 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from llmx2.ll.mit.edu (LLMX2.LL.MIT.EDU [129.55.12.48]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C8F1B3A12AF for <cfrg@irtf.org>; Wed, 1 Apr 2020 09:36:23 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from LLE2K16-MBX02.mitll.ad.local (LLE2K16-MBX02.mitll.ad.local) by llmx2.ll.mit.edu (unknown) with ESMTPS id 031GaLZH022372; Wed, 1 Apr 2020 12:36:21 -0400
From: "Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL" <uri@ll.mit.edu>
To: Michael StJohns <msj@nthpermutation.com>
CC: "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] Encrypt in place guidance
Thread-Index: AQHWCC7G69TVJWSFL0ue+QmPsR+m6KhknsqAgAAVcoCAAAXLgA==
Date: Wed, 1 Apr 2020 16:36:20 +0000
Message-ID: <C74B1C87-1129-4E6E-96FE-AE5678183AFA@ll.mit.edu>
References: <6f41ddbd-d2ec-1ecc-deca-9230f11fa421@nthpermutation.com>
In-Reply-To: <6f41ddbd-d2ec-1ecc-deca-9230f11fa421@nthpermutation.com>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: yes
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator:
x-ms-exchange-messagesentrepresentingtype: 1
Content-Type: multipart/signed; boundary="Apple-Mail-921D7CA3-5CBC-4D25-AC9D-FD4A7C306B04"; protocol="application/pkcs7-signature"; micalg=sha-256
MIME-Version: 1.0
X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:6.0.138, 18.0.676 definitions=2020-04-01_03:2020-03-31, 2020-04-01 signatures=0
X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=notspam policy=default score=0 suspectscore=0 malwarescore=0 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 mlxscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-2002250000 definitions=main-2004010144
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/cfrg/KltQBEuBddciXRtdSZRBsPBEjCA>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Encrypt in place guidance
X-BeenThere: cfrg@irtf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
Precedence: list
List-Id: Crypto Forum Research Group <cfrg.irtf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.irtf.org/mailman/options/cfrg>, <mailto:cfrg-request@irtf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/cfrg/>
List-Post: <mailto:cfrg@irtf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:cfrg-request@irtf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg>, <mailto:cfrg-request@irtf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 01 Apr 2020 16:36:31 -0000

Performance of CFB8 leaves something to be desired. Some chips have hardware AES, others don’t. 

I for one am happy with what I’ve seen of the security analysis and the algorithm design itself. YMMV. 

Sizes of IV and auth tag depend on the use case and it’s threat model (did I say that already?). Though I concede that if the use case can tolerate full-size for them, there’s no reason to do otherwise (in my area there’s no such thing as “excessive force” :).

Regards,
Uri

Sent from my iPhone

> On Apr 1, 2020, at 12:16, Michael StJohns <msj@nthpermutation.com> wrote:
> 
> 
> Pretty much every IOT chip these days has support for at least AES 128 (and usually for ECB and  CTR and/or CCM).   Unless there is a good reason to use something else, assuming you have a good IV source, use AES-CTR - it can be used for any number of bytes without expansion.  If you don't have a great IV source, use something like AES-CFB8.   Avoid domain specific algorithms that may or may not have had security analyses done that are appropriate to your domain.
> 
> You should have some some sort of message authentication/integrity protection and that's a physics problem that needs to be solved by allocating some additional bytes.  Generally at least 4 for an integrity tag.   If you have that space, move to AES-CCM as your mode.
> 
> IMO, Speck may be a better choice later on as it gains more public experience and more implementations but you may want to think twice about including it in a specification at this time. 
> Later, Mike
> 
> 
> 
> On 4/1/2020 10:58 AM, Robert Moskowitz wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 4/1/20 10:06 AM, Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL wrote:
>>> Robert,
>>> 
>>> You're in luck, because Speck offers 96-bit block-size (with key size 96 or 144 bits). ;-)
>> 
>> I did see that and felt it was a strong point for Speck.
>> 
>>> This (variable block size) was one of the advantages of Speck over, e.g., AES. So the ISO first trimmed it down to the AES capabilities, and then decided "oh well, we already have AES".
>> 
>> I saw that in the IACR slides:
>> 
>> Gee look at all these great advantages it has.
>> 
>> But the other guys don't, so let's strip them out.
>> 
>> Oh, gee, no advantage here, so let's just drop it.
>> 
>> Got to love that logic.  Of course if it is really a broken cipher, then it is broken.
>> 
>> There is really crypto justification for AEAD.  But this comes at a serious cost that sometimes cannot be met.
>> 
>> Having options like what Speck provides has value.  Not great, but a real value.
>> 
>> Yes, there are all sorts of replay attacks.  There are some use-case related mitigations.  In this case, so the operator is lieing about where they are.  So what, they can do that anyway and have all the crypto right.
>> 
>> This is why, on a system level, we are proposing how an authorized entity can directly and securely message the operator's control system with such things as:  "Land now or be shot out of the air and THEN we will come to get you." Much more timely than trying to send an officer to the supposed Geo position of the operator first.
>> 
>> :)
>> 
>>> On 4/1/20, 09:38, "Cfrg on behalf of Leo Perrin" <cfrg-bounces@irtf.org on behalf of leo.perrin@inria.fr> wrote:
>>> 
>>>     
>>>     > So I am looking for both a 64 bit and 96 bit block cipher.  I figured
>>>     > out that if there is no 96 bit, I can do this by first encrypting the
>>>     > 1st 64 bits and then the last 64 bits.  The middle 32bits are double
>>>     > encrypted, but I not seeing that as a problem. But then I am not a
>>>     > cryptographer, only a crypto-plumber.
>>>     
>>>     I would advise you *not* to do this: this effectively creates a 96-bit block cipher with at least one significant flaw.
>>>     
>>>     Suppose that your plaintext is (A,B,C), where each word is 32-bit long, and that you use a block cipher E_k operating on 64 bits. Then you would first obtain (W,X) = E_k(A,B), and then (Y,Z) = E_k(X,C), so that the encryption of (A,B,C) is (W,Y,Z). The problem with this approach is that W does not depend on C. A similar behaviour exists for decryption (C does not depend on W). As a consequence, this 96-bit block cipher does not provide full diffusion!
>>>     
>>>     It is better to use a dedicated 96-bit block cipher. There are not many of them but they exist:
>>>     - BKSQ, from the AES designers (essentially a 96-bit AES);
>>>     - SEA,
>>>     - EPCBC.
>>>     The references for these are in our survey.
>>>     
>>>     If you really need to turn a 64-bit block cipher into a 96-bit one, then you would need to do at least 3 iterations of the 64-bit cipher instead of 2 as you suggested:
>>>     
>>>     (A, B, C) ---(E_k, Id)---> (W, X, C)
>>>     (W, X, C) ---(Id, E_k)---> (W, Y, Z)
>>>     (W, Y, Z) ---(E_k, Id)---> (T, U, Z)
>>>     
>>>     Still: from a security stand-point, I would much prefer a dedicated 96-bit cipher if I were in your position.
>>>     
>>>     Cheers,
>>>     
>>>     /Léo
>>>     
>>>     _______________________________________________
>>>     Cfrg mailing list
>>>     Cfrg@irtf.org
>>>     https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>>>     
>>> 
>>> 
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> Cfrg mailing list
>>> Cfrg@irtf.org
>>> https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> _______________________________________________
>> Cfrg mailing list
>> Cfrg@irtf.org
>> https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
> 
> _______________________________________________
> Cfrg mailing list
> Cfrg@irtf.org
> https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg