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Re: [CFRG] RSA PSS Salt Length for HTTP Message Signatures

denis bider <denisbider.ietf@gmail.com> Sat, 29 May 2021 01:50 UTC

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From: denis bider <denisbider.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 28 May 2021 20:49:55 -0500
Message-ID: <CADPMZDB0888gD-WdA+fX=pszUD87MeC44pEUr7U_xKJhN+tj_Q@mail.gmail.com>
To: "Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL" <uri@ll.mit.edu>
Cc: IRTF CFRG <cfrg@irtf.org>
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Subject: Re: [CFRG] RSA PSS Salt Length for HTTP Message Signatures
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> if we start rejecting better crypto algorithms because it's possible to
> screw up their Implementation, it's unlikely that we end up in a good
place.

The only argument I'm EVER seeing presented against PKCS#1 v1.5 is exactly
the one you refuse to admit against RSA-PSS: the likelihood of incorrect
implementation.

This is even though this thread has shown that PKCS#1 v1.5 is trivial to
implement correctly (encode then memcmp), whereas RSA-PSS is incredibly
hard.

denis


On Fri, May 28, 2021 at 2:52 PM Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL <
uri@ll.mit.edu> wrote:

> On 5/28/21, 09:21, "CFRG on behalf of Salz, Rich" <cfrg-bounces@irtf.org
> on behalf of rsalz=40akamai.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
>
> >    Perhaps reconsider PSS.
> https://www.metzdowd.com/pipermail/cryptography/2019-November/035449.html
> is excellent reading.
>
> There is some reason in Peter's arguments - but if we start rejecting
> better crypto algorithms because it's possible to screw up their
> Implementation, it's unlikely that we end up in a good place. ;-)
>
> Brian Smith (and others) outlined a good strategy for this, and pretty
> much every other similar concern: fix the parameter set.
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