Re: [Cfrg] normative references
Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com> Wed, 15 January 2014 23:06 UTC
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From: Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com>
To: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 15 Jan 2014 15:05:58 -0800
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] normative references
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References: <mailman.4685.1389738617.2658.cfrg@irtf.org> <52D645EC.4000408@gmail.com> <52D684EE.9050304@cisco.com> <CEFBFBE5.2C52B%paul@marvell.com> <CACsn0cmegQ8_CjCFx7VN30yQ=P=Neb8kLr-i+wgj680E16V1rQ@mail.gmail.com> <7BAC95F5A7E67643AAFB2C31BEE662D018B7FB9B37@SC-VEXCH2.marvell.com> <CACsn0cnw8MydqSxL0fEjM+jzB+UUfqwMoMVqG2Df99pU30Tr5A@mail.gmail.com>
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Cc: Yaron Sheffer <yaronf.ietf@gmail.com>, David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] normative references
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Watson, >> ⨳|> There is a significant body of work on implementing Weierstrass >> ⨳|curves >> ⨳|> (ANSI, IEEE, NIST, NSA, etc.). Edwards, Twisted Edwards and >> ⨳|> Montgomery need the same level of documentation to progress. >> ⨳| >> ⨳|Or the same level of C library support. I'd much rather have everyone >> ⨳|copy a well-made library then write their own bugs we have to deal >> ⨳|with down the line/that the SIGINT people exploit. But yes, better >> ⨳|documentation about how to implement is necessary. >> We're in the documentation business here - not code libraries. Plus >>we're >> supposed to have multiple interoperable different implementations. > >Do you really think everyone implementing P256 does it themselves? Or do >they >take example code from the Internet? I have seen a large number of P256 implementations … few if any from the public domain. Existence of an open source library is not an excuse for a sloppy RFC. If this is the direction you are going, we would just need to write a one-line pointer to the source code. Real products implement in hardware, on multiple processor types … etc. I’ve been trying to be helpful, but your arguments against well intended suggestions is frustrating. It’s difficult to contribute if you’re arguing for a sloppy RFC because the code is the reference. I was pointing to specific examples that we could emulate in a perhaps more simple manner. The next step would be get a summary of the relevant details required and emulate one or more of these documents. >> ⨳|If we aren't specifying any twisted Edwards curves, why would we >> ⨳|define the formulas? >> ⨳|I suppose for use with Montgomery form, ala Ransom's suggestion. >> [ ⨳] >> Yes ... and why did you leave out Ed25519? It's being used and >>should at least be discussed/reviewed/ > >It's the same as Curve25519, and not in safecurves. Let's be real >clear: isogenies don't change anything substantial. Substantial??? Curve22519 is not interoperable with Ed25519. What could be more substantial. A point on one curve would have a different x and y value than a curve on the other. This is one of my core issues with having mathematicians write protocols … the apparent mathematical precision make the implementations very fuzzy. >If you want to discuss it separately, go ahead: plenty of people have >been discussing alternatives on this list already. Discuss … no, let me be clear and rephrase. Please add Ed25519 to the RFC. > >I'm also going to explain the Montgomery ladder and double-and-add on >Edwards and that's it. RFC 6090 doesn't talk about >radix-k either, nor does it explain Shamir's trick, or fun with the >Brier-Joyce ladder, or w-NAF, etc. >> >> >> ⨳| >> ⨳|> >> ⨳|> 2) reuse where possible terminology and variables from >>Weierstrass >> ⨳|ECC >> ⨳|> E.g. P for prime defining Fp, n for order, h for cofactor >> ⨳|> This would allow all classes of curves to viewed equally >>in >> ⨳|> an implementation catalog >> ⨳|> E.g. >> ⨳|> >> ⨳|> curveId = 'curve25519' >> ⨳|> strength = 127 >> ⨳|> oid = None >> ⨳|> p = 2**255-19 >> ⨳|> a = 486662 >> ⨳|> xG = 9 >> ⨳|> yG = >>... ... > >I still don't see why this form is much better than a paragraph >listing these things. > >> ⨳|Also, different things should be written differently. >> [ ⨳] >> >> On the Edwards curves with cofactors >1 I believe the strength estimate >>may be a little less >> than simply taking the bit length of the size / 2 >> >> Advice on this small adjustment would be appreciated. > >Size of the group generated by g, not the size of the curve. Oh … of course, thanks. > >> >> >> ⨳| >> ⨳|> Also Š long numbers should be consistently represented hex >> ⨳|versus >> ⨳|> decimal >> ⨳| >> ⨳|Why hex? Most math papers use decimal, and more importantly GP/PARI >> ⨳|doesn't accept hex. >> ⨳|MAGMA, PARI and Sage are going to be used for test vector validation. >> [ ⨳] >> By you maybe ... >> >> Hex fits better in an RFC ... decimal would be fine also. > >Six of one, half-dozen of the other. > >> >> ⨳| >> ⨳|> Note also - Weierstrass Œa¹ is not the same as Edwards Œa¹, but >> ⨳|> can be written around Š and we should keep Edwards equations >> ⨳|consistent >> ⨳|> where possible with literature. >> ⨳| >> ⨳|When we define DH exchange on a group yes. With setting the >>parameters >> ⨳|like you did we're tempting fate. >> Not really ... just another area for clear specification, eg: >> >> Suggested RFC text: >> >> The ECC definitions include three classes of curves defined over >>the field >> of integers modulo a prime p (Fp). Each class of curve has an >>equation and >> assoicated parameters unique to the class type. Three classes of >>curves >> are described: >> >> SmallWeierstrassCurveFp y**2 = x**3 + a*x + b mod p >> EdwardsCurveFp x**2 + y**2 = c*(1 + d*x**2 * y**2) mod p >> MontgomeryCurveFp y**2 = x**3 + a*x**2 + x mod p >> >> The defintions include for each curve type: >> >> curveId - An ASCII string used to identify the curve parameters >> strength - an integer providing the estimated cryptographic >>strength >> of the curve as a power of 2 >> oid - a list of integers that correspond to the associated ASN.1 >>object >> identifier. The oid is listed as 'None' if there is no >>assigned oid >> p - The prime modulus of the group (Fp). Often p is a Mersenne >>prime >> to facilitate more efficient modular inversion >> xG - the x-coordinate of a generator point G for the curve >> yG - the y-coordinate of a generator point G for the curve >> n - the order of the generator point G >> seed - included for reference when available >> h - the cofactor of the curve >> >> Each curve type has the following unique parameters >> >> Small Wierstrass y**2 = x**3 + a*x + b mod p >> a - often set to p-3 for efficiency >> b - elected for the security properties of the curve shape >> z - used by 'twisted' Brainpool curves for isogenous transform >> of untwisted curve to a curve with a = p-3 >> >> Montgomery y**2 = x**3 + c*x**2 + x mod p >> a - selected for the security properties of the curve shape >> >> Edwards x**2 + y**2 = c*(1 + d*x**2 * y**2) mod p >> c - typically set to 1 so the equation is reduced to: >> x**2 + y**2 = 1 + d*x**2 * y**2 mod p >> d - selected for the security properties of the curve shape >> >> Hummm .. could add Twisted Edwards to the above > >But none of the curves in safecurves are presented in twisted Edwards >form, >I'm not going to rehash short Weierstrass here, (RFC 6090 already exists). Ok … but introducing Weierstrass allows comparisons and clarity of specification. No eed to fully define Weierstrass … it’s just easier to have a complete view of all options. Paul > >Anyway, I think this conversation would be far more productive when I >finish the revisions and put it before >the group again. You can follow on github in between. > >> >> ⨳| >> ⨳|> >> ⨳|> >> ⨳|> 3) Use math representation in RFCs that maps directly to a >> ⨳|computer >> ⨳|> language notation - Python would be a good choice for >> ⨳|> readability. >> ⨳|> E.g. Twisted Edwards point addition definition >> ⨳|> >> ⨳|> x3 = ((x1*y2+x2*y1) * inv(1+d*x1*x2*y1*y2)) % p >> ⨳|> y3 = ((y1*y2-a*x1*x2) * inv(1-d*x1*x2*y1*y2)) % p >> ⨳| >> ⨳|The math notation I am using maps directly to that of most CAS >> [ ⨳] >> No - for example: >> " On Montgomery curves, curves of the form y^2=x^3+Ax^2+x, the typical" >> is Ax a variable 'Ax' or A*x ... this is sloppy non-parseable notation > >> ⨳|systems. Anyway, at some point I will be done with the major >>revision, >> ⨳|and kick it around for comments. >> [ ⨳] >> CAS??? >> I prefer running code useable for a protocol implementation. > >So I can just copy the relevant parts of tweetnacl.c and be done with it? > >> >> Paul >> >> ⨳| >> ⨳|> >> ⨳|> 4) curve names need consolidation and should clearly indicate >> ⨳|curve >> ⨳|> type >> ⨳| >> ⨳|Blame Tanja. I really do not like the idea of changing existing names >> ⨳|especially when referring people to papers with them. SEC/NIST has >> ⨳|already caused enough confusing as it is. >> [ ⨳] >> No need to blame, just make the change but include reference to >>original author and curve name. >> NIST did not add confusion ... just branded the results. >> CFRG branding would be valuable. More curves will happen and a >>consistent notation is a good thing. > >What do you propose for the name scheme? E,M with prime in the expc >format is my best proposal, but this might not be unique all the time. >> >> Paul >> >> ⨳| >> ⨳|> >> ⨳|> >> ⨳|> >> ⨳|> >> ⨳|> Paul >> ⨳|> >> ⨳|> >> ⨳|> >> ⨳|> > >> ⨳|> >David >> ⨳|> > >> ⨳|> >> >> ⨳|> >> Thanks, >> ⨳|> >> Yaron >> ⨳|> >> >> ⨳|> >> _______________________________________________ >> ⨳|> >> Cfrg mailing list >> ⨳|> >> Cfrg@irtf.org >> ⨳|> >> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg >> ⨳|> >> >> ⨳|> > >> ⨳|> >_______________________________________________ >> ⨳|> >Cfrg mailing list >> ⨳|> >Cfrg@irtf.org >> ⨳|> >http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg >> ⨳|> >> ⨳|> _______________________________________________ >> ⨳|> Cfrg mailing list >> ⨳|> Cfrg@irtf.org >> ⨳|> http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg > > > >-- >"Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little >Temporary Safety deserve neither Liberty nor Safety." >-- Benjamin Franklin
- Re: [Cfrg] normative references Paul Lambert
- Re: [Cfrg] normative references Yaron Sheffer
- Re: [Cfrg] normative references David McGrew
- Re: [Cfrg] normative references Paul Lambert
- Re: [Cfrg] normative references Watson Ladd
- [Cfrg] EdDSA private key restrictions & composabi… Adam Back
- Re: [Cfrg] EdDSA private key restrictions & compo… David McGrew
- Re: [Cfrg] normative references Watson Ladd
- Re: [Cfrg] normative references Paul Hoffman
- Re: [Cfrg] normative references Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard
- Re: [Cfrg] normative references Dan Harkins
- Re: [Cfrg] normative references Paul Lambert
- Re: [Cfrg] normative references Watson Ladd