Re: [Cfrg] [irsg] IRSG review of draft-irtf-cfrg-xmss-hash-based-signatures-08

"A. Huelsing" <ietf@huelsing.net> Tue, 27 June 2017 13:01 UTC

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From: "A. Huelsing" <ietf@huelsing.net>
To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>, "Paterson, Kenny" <Kenny.Paterson@rhul.ac.uk>, Alexey Melnikov <alexey.melnikov@isode.com>, "irsg@irtf.org" <irsg@irtf.org>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <Cfrg@irtf.org>
Cc: "draft-irtf-cfrg-xmss-hash-based-signatures@ietf.org" <draft-irtf-cfrg-xmss-hash-based-signatures@ietf.org>
References: <D4FDAF9D.8D586%kenny.paterson@rhul.ac.uk> <9a878527-5ab9-5429-7c5d-4f7e4ca4e8db@isode.com> <08944dc3-9086-ed47-cc1b-54248b3dac70@cs.tcd.ie> <D566ADE0.963E4%kenny.paterson@rhul.ac.uk> <9e6b6146-e376-86cb-70be-0127a3e72d16@cs.tcd.ie> <D56DBB2C.96A67%kenny.paterson@rhul.ac.uk> <6f90e485-01f4-5ad8-49ef-e51c52e01a46@cs.tcd.ie> <5e328e85-a8a1-67f1-3853-418309b04a17@huelsing.net>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] [irsg] IRSG review of draft-irtf-cfrg-xmss-hash-based-signatures-08
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Hi Stephen, hi Kenny, hi Alexey,

We are currently going through the review. While we didn't handle the nits yet,
we made up our mind about the first four points (see below). Regarding the last
point of test vectors.
We think it is better to add a reference implementation. We would now just add
the C code as appendix. Would that be fine? Are there any conditions on code? We
have dependencies to OpenSSL for SHA2.

>>>> possible errors:
>>>> ----------------
>>>>
>>>> - 3.1.2: Algorithm 2: "if ( (i + s) > w - 1 )..." seems to be
>>>> missing parenthesis around the "(w-1)" to me.  Without those
>>>> brackets I could interpret that test to always result in false.
Added parenthesis.
>>>> - 4.1.9: should the call to setIdx in alg 12 be after treeSig?
>>>>  as-is you seem to have incremented the index too soon so
>>>> that when alg 11 does getIdx it'd presumably get the
>>>> incremented index and cause verification failure. I think
>>>> the same is true of alg 16 as well, in section 4.2.4.
Indeed, we now give idx_sig as additional input (and don't use the already
updated index from SK anymore).
>>>> significant comments, but likely fixable:
>>>> -----------------------------------------
>>>>
>>>> - section 5: there are waaaay too many options defined here.
>>>>  As-is, this will damage potential deployment of xmss. I
>>>> would strongly suggest deleting all of the options except the
>>>> minimum, that being one (and only one) set of parameters for
>>>> XMSS and one for XMSS^MT. If others are needed later, those
>>>> can be defined later. (Note that the damage done here includes
>>>> the hours of developer time that would be wasted debating
>>>> which of these choices to implement/use. Consider the case of
>>>> pre-hash variants of eddsa for an ongoing example.)
Got your point Our noted todos are:
####
#   1.) Select 1 XMSS & 1 XMSS^MT parameter set as default options
#   2.) Explain that all other h / d combis are fine but we can only give
limited number
#   3.) Add sizes & #sigs for parameter sets
#   4.) Explain trade-offs
#   5.) Make implementation of verification for all parameters mandatory / sign
just a para suggestion
####
Do you agree?
>>>> - section 5 (or an appendix) should contain some test vectors
>>>>  (including intermediate values). Without those, implementers
>>>> have a much harder time of getting their code right.
See above.

Cheers,

Stefan & Andreas
>>>> nits, near-nits and other ignorable things:
>>>> -------------------------------------------
>>>>
>>>> - abstract: I'd suggest s/can withstand attacks/ can withstand
>>>>  so-far known attacks/
>>>>
>>>> - 1.1: You say if used >1 time "no cryptographic security
>>>>  guarantees remain." It might be clearer to give some
>>>> examples of consequences, e.g. that the attacker can forge new
>>>> signatures or whatever.
>>>>
>>>> - 1.1: I think you might mention that XMSS and other OTS ideas
>>>>  require some new crypto APIs. I'm not aware if anyone has
>>>> developed proposals for such, but would be interested if
>>>> someone has.
>>>>
>>>> - 2.3, 2nd last para: you might want to say what happens with
>>>>  e.g.  B<<2 where B=0xf0. I assume the result is 0xc0 but
>>>> someone might think it's 0x3c0 or even 0xc3.
>>>>
>>>> - 2.5: having the "type word" as octet 15 of a 32 byte address
>>>>  seems odd. Is there a reason why? (Just wondering.)
>>>>
>>>> - 2.6: It seems odd to given an example where the input and
>>>>  output of base_w() are the same. A different example may be
>>>> more useful. (More examples generally would be great.)
>>>>
>>>> - 3.1.3: maybe note that "/" means nothing? Which I assume it
>>>>  does? Better might be to just say that.
>>>>
>>>> - 3.1.5: "a maximum value of len_1 * (w - 1) * 2^8" is missing
>>>>  units
>>>>
>>>> - 3.1.5: "the variable" - which one?
>>>>
>>>> - 3.1.5: "For the parameter sets given in Section 5 a 32-bit
>>>>  unsigned integer is sufficient." Sufficient for what?
>>>>
>>>> - 3.1.5: The ascii art at the end of p16 doesn't help much.
>>>>
>>>> - 3.1.7: The "MUST match" statement doesn't seem enforceable
>>>>  nor testable so I'm not sure it's a good idea to include.
>>>> OTOH, I do get the idea of using 2119 terms for emphasis.
>>>>
>>>> - 3.1.7: I think it might be useful to point out any specific
>>>>  problems associated with using a low entropy human memorable
>>>> secret (password) for the value S. No matter what you say,
>>>> people will do that, so better if you can say you told them
>>>> specifically about downsides of doing that.
>>>>
>>>> - 4.1.12: I'm not sure if the MAY there is correct or not.  If
>>>>  it means "you MAY use a different algorithm to get the same
>>>> output as alg 12" then that'd be fine. If something else is
>>>> meant I'm not sure what you're saying, and it'd probably be
>>>> better to not even mention it.
>>>>
>>>> - section 5 should also spell out the signature and
>>>> public key sizes in bytes and ideally, if you keep multiple
>>>> options, (but please don't:-) describe relative or measured
>>>> timings.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>