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Re: [Cfrg] SHE Key Update Protocol

Henry B Hotz <hbhotz@oxy.edu> Fri, 13 April 2018 13:57 UTC

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From: Henry B Hotz <hbhotz@oxy.edu>
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Date: Fri, 13 Apr 2018 06:57:17 -0700
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To: =JeffH <Jeff.Hodges@KingsMountain.com>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] SHE Key Update Protocol
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Thanks. 

Personal email. hbhotz@oxy.edu

> On Apr 11, 2018, at 1:49 PM, =JeffH <Jeff.Hodges@KingsMountain.com> wrote:
> 
> > Anyone know of any published formal analysis/modeling of it?
> 
> hm, I get only one hit when searching goog scholar for [ "SHE Key Update" Protocol ]:
> 
> Approaches for secure and efficient in-vehicle key management
> T Sugashima, DK Oka, C Vuillaume - SAE International Journal of …, 2016 - papers.sae.org
> https://www.denso.com/jp/ja/innovation/technology/dtr/v21/paper-16.pdf
> 
> ..which contains some modest threat analysis.
> 
> In it, they say in part:
> 
> HIS,  a  car  consortium  consisting  of  several  major
> German  auto  manufacturers,  has  developed  an
> implementation  specification  for  secure  hardware
> called  SHE  (secure  hardware  extension).  SHE
> provides  various  security  functionalities  such  as  MAC
> generation  and  verification  based  on  a  hardware  AES
> engine  and  loading  of  symmetric  keys  into  secure
> key  storage.  To  be  able  to  support  security  use  cases
> where  SHE  functionality  is  not  sufficient,  Bosch  has
> developed  a  Bosch  HSM  (hardware  security  module)
> specification.  HSM  provides  further  support  for
> security  functionalities  as  it  has  in  addition  to  a
> hardware  AES  engine,  a  dedicated  secure  CPU  and
> secure  memory  allowing  it  to  be  programmable  to
> support  a  vast  range  of  use  cases.  The  AUTOSAR
> specification  4.2.1  includes  CSM  (crypto  services
> manager)  and  describes  how  cryptographic  keys
> can  be  used  to  support  use  cases  such  as  to  protect
> the  in-vehicle  communication.
> 
> 
> tho search goog scholar for [ SHE  "Secure hardware extension" analysis ] yields some further hits, including:
> 
> Design, implementation, and evaluation of a vehicular hardware security module
> M Wolf, T Gendrullis - … Conference on Information Security and Cryptology, 2011 - Springer
> http://www.marko-wolf.de/files/WoGe12_Automotive_HSM.pdf
> 
> ..also containing some modest security analysis.
> 
> HTH,
> 
> =JeffH
> 
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