Re: [Cfrg] Fwd: I-D Action: draft-yonezawa-pairing-friendly-curves-01.txt

Hi Peter,

>> Another thing about PQC is that all of this is entirely new crypto that
we
have no experience in using.  We've had decades of experience with using
PreQC, and have mostly managed to get it right (a lot of the attacks being
performed were known about years ago but were ignored until someone
published
an attack paper with accompanying tools and newsworthy name, and even then
there's a huge amount of code in PreQC crypto designed specifically to
prevent
entire classes of attacks), while we have zero experience with using PQC.

This is an argument for being cautious about deploying PQC. It's not an
argument
that it's a good idea to develop new PreQC primitives. If anything, it's an
argument
against that.

Cheers,

William

On Tue, Apr 2, 2019 at 7:57 PM Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
wrote:

> Björn Haase <bjoern.m.haase@web.de> writes:
>
> >We know that the cost of conventional attacks is low and many applications
> >are actually "worth" the effort of an attack.
>
> Another thing about PQC is that all of this is entirely new crypto that we
> have no experience in using.  We've had decades of experience with using
> PreQC, and have mostly managed to get it right (a lot of the attacks being
> performed were known about years ago but were ignored until someone
> published
> an attack paper with accompanying tools and newsworthy name, and even then
> there's a huge amount of code in PreQC crypto designed specifically to
> prevent
> entire classes of attacks), while we have zero experience with using PQC.
> Which means we're going to see years if not decades of new attacks, or the
> same old attacks that were fixed in PreQC implementations, popping up with
> PQC.  It's quite possible that PQC will make us a lot *less* secure, if QC
> never really happens but the expected vulnerabilities in using PQC do.
>
> In fact I'll make this prediction now:
>
>   Likelihood of successful attacks due to QC: Epsilon.
>   Likelihood of successful attacks due to use of PQC over PreQC: 100.0%.
>
> (the second figure should actually be much higher than 100%, because
> there'll
> be many, many of them, not just one).
>
> Peter.
>
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