[Cfrg] Closing out tls1.3 "Limits on key usage" PRs (#765/#769)

Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com> Fri, 10 February 2017 05:07 UTC

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From: Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>
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Date: Fri, 10 Feb 2017 00:07:35 -0500
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Subject: [Cfrg] Closing out tls1.3 "Limits on key usage" PRs (#765/#769)
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All,

We’ve got two outstanding PRs that propose changes to draft-ietf-tls-tls13 Section 5.5 “Limits on Key Usage”.  As it relates to rekeying, these limits have been discussed a couple of times and we need to resolve once and for all whether the TLS WG wants to:

a) Close these two PRs and go with the existing text [0]
b) Adopt PR#765 [1]
c) Adopt PR#769 [2]

Please indicate you preference to the TLS mailing list before Feb 17.  Note that unless there’s clear consensus to change the text will remain as is (i.e., option a).

J&S

[0] https://tlswg.github.io/tls13-spec/#rfc.section.5.5
[1] https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/765
[2] https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/769