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Re: [Cfrg] Adopting "AES-GCM-SIV: Nonce Misuse-Resistant Authenticated Encryption" as a CFRG document ---- Some clarifications

Thomas Peyrin <thomas.peyrin@gmail.com> Wed, 20 April 2016 16:48 UTC

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Date: Thu, 21 Apr 2016 00:48:25 +0800
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From: Thomas Peyrin <thomas.peyrin@gmail.com>
To: "Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL" <uri@ll.mit.edu>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Adopting "AES-GCM-SIV: Nonce Misuse-Resistant Authenticated Encryption" as a CFRG document ---- Some clarifications
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2016-04-21 0:25 GMT+08:00 Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL <uri@ll.mit.edu>:

> But if you see a problem with GCM-SIV security proofs (or assumptions
> they’re based on), by all means speak up.
>
> I don't think I have ever said that ?




> Fine with me. Take a short look and write a draft for another algorithm.
> Explaining what properties you need that are missing  in GCM-SIV would be
> nice too.
>

Perhaps before writing a draft for all CAESAR candidates (or even AES-based
CAESAR candidates), we could spend a little time discussing what would be
the advantages of the various options we have at hand ? I would say for 2nd
round AES-based CAESAR candidates that provide some kind of misuse
resistance, we should consider AES-COPA, AEZ, Deoxys, ElmD, POET and SHELL
(I hope I didn't forget any).

Thomas.

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