Re: [Cfrg] I updated 3 drafts related to a FSU KeyEX

Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> Thu, 28 April 2016 09:26 UTC

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To: Michael Scott <mike.scott@miracl.com>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] I updated 3 drafts related to a FSU KeyEX
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Hi Mike,

On 28/04/16 09:35, Michael Scott wrote:
> Maybe the more accurate phrase "n uniquely attractive targets" where
> n=2,3,4... doesn't carry quite the same punch!

I'm sorry, but for me, it does have exactly the same
punch. If there are key generators, they can collude
or be coerced. Or even more likely, in a realistic
commercial Internet-scale deployment, it's quite likely
all of them (even if operated by different entities)
may be running on one or two mega-hosting platform,
so there may well be only one thing to break into
even if it looks like N things.

From my POV, the mandatory key escrow aspect of IBE
is basically fatal for all but possibly some small
set of niche applications.

Cheers,
S.