IETF Logo Mail Archive

Re: [Cfrg] Do we need a selection contest for AEAD?

"Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL" <uri@ll.mit.edu> Fri, 19 June 2020 17:51 UTC

Return-Path: <prvs=34391a244d=uri@ll.mit.edu>
X-Original-To: cfrg@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: cfrg@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id EC5EB3A0C74 for <cfrg@ietfa.amsl.com>; Fri, 19 Jun 2020 10:51:21 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.894
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.894 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, MIME_QP_LONG_LINE=0.001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_NONE=0.001, UNPARSEABLE_RELAY=0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id dB2g714WoFxp for <cfrg@ietfa.amsl.com>; Fri, 19 Jun 2020 10:51:20 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from llmx2.ll.mit.edu (LLMX2.LL.MIT.EDU [129.55.12.48]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id ED0803A0B25 for <cfrg@irtf.org>; Fri, 19 Jun 2020 10:51:19 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from LLE2K16-MBX04.mitll.ad.local (LLE2K16-MBX04.mitll.ad.local) by llmx2.ll.mit.edu (unknown) with ESMTPS id 05JHpHen046592; Fri, 19 Jun 2020 13:51:18 -0400
From: "Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL" <uri@ll.mit.edu>
To: Thomas Peyrin <thomas.peyrin@gmail.com>, "Stanislav V. Smyshlyaev" <smyshsv@gmail.com>
CC: CFRG <cfrg@irtf.org>
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] Do we need a selection contest for AEAD?
Thread-Index: AQHWRl+/a1yZqWKXrUWtt9h91T1RYajgeYcA//++LgA=
Date: Fri, 19 Jun 2020 17:51:16 +0000
Message-ID: <4CFDB50C-6281-4AC8-A9DF-D0F79BF58C5C@ll.mit.edu>
References: <CAMr0u6=QJuG9mshppB6qeryk6qekVKgi9D=WqGoa_L4sNgtYLg@mail.gmail.com> <CAA0wV7TXftZXeteCy3=N_4ezXRTL852_R1kCCPYGFEhQNHGw2Q@mail.gmail.com>
In-Reply-To: <CAA0wV7TXftZXeteCy3=N_4ezXRTL852_R1kCCPYGFEhQNHGw2Q@mail.gmail.com>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: yes
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator:
user-agent: Microsoft-MacOutlook/16.37.20051002
x-originating-ip: [172.25.1.85]
Content-Type: multipart/signed; protocol="application/pkcs7-signature"; micalg="sha256"; boundary="B_3675419476_1252270916"
MIME-Version: 1.0
X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:6.0.216, 18.0.687 definitions=2020-06-19_20:2020-06-19, 2020-06-19 signatures=0
X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=notspam policy=default score=0 suspectscore=0 malwarescore=0 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 mlxscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-2004280000 definitions=main-2006190132
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/cfrg/a8dGhCFrIo_rVg0Fn-ywre5eAA4>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Do we need a selection contest for AEAD?
X-BeenThere: cfrg@irtf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
Precedence: list
List-Id: Crypto Forum Research Group <cfrg.irtf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.irtf.org/mailman/options/cfrg>, <mailto:cfrg-request@irtf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/cfrg/>
List-Post: <mailto:cfrg@irtf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:cfrg-request@irtf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg>, <mailto:cfrg-request@irtf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 19 Jun 2020 17:51:22 -0000

Can you provide/compute security bounds for truncated synthetic IV?  Some (niche) use cases require it.

 

From: Cfrg <cfrg-bounces@irtf.org> on behalf of Thomas Peyrin <thomas.peyrin@gmail.com>
Date: Friday, June 19, 2020 at 1:47 PM
To: "Stanislav V. Smyshlyaev" <smyshsv@gmail.com>
Cc: CFRG <cfrg@irtf.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Do we need a selection contest for AEAD?

 

Dear all, 

 

I will be actually sending an RFC draft of Deoxys in the coming weeks like I promised a few months ago (really sorry, with the COVID-19 confining with young kids at home, I couldn't advance on it). It will contain misuse resistant mode (with stronger guarantees than AES-GCM-SIV), leakage resilient mode with different levels of resilience, the possiblity to encrypt 2^124 bytes per key. We are currently analyzing the INT-RUP security of it. All this for about the same efficiency as AES-GCM-SIV.

 

Regards,

 

Thomas.

 

 

Le sam. 20 juin 2020 à 01:32, Stanislav V. Smyshlyaev <smyshsv@gmail.com> a écrit :

Dear CFRG,

The chairs would like to ask for opinions whether it seems reasonable to initiate an AEAD mode selection contest in CFRG, to review modern AEAD modes and recommend a mode (or several modes) for the IETF.

We’ve recently had a CAESAR contest, and, of course, its results have to be taken into account very seriously. In addition to the properties that were primarily addressed during the CAESAR contest (like protection against side-channel attacks, authenticity/limited privacy damage in case of nonce misuse or release of unverified plaintexts, robustness in such scenarios as huge amounts of data), the following properties may be especially important for the usage of AEAD mechanisms in IETF protocols:

1) Leakage resistance.
2) Incremental AEAD.
3) Commitment AEAD (we've had a discussion in the list a while ago).
4) RUP-security (it was discussed in the CAESAR contest, but the finalists may have some issues with it, as far as I understand).

5) Ability to safely encrypt a larger maximum number of bytes per key (discussed in QUIC WG)..


Does this look reasonable?
Any thoughts about the possible aims of the contest?  
Any other requirements for the mode?

Regards,

Stanislav, Alexey, Nick

_______________________________________________
Cfrg mailing list
Cfrg@irtf.org
https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg

v2.23.0 | Report a Bug | By Email