Re: [CFRG] Symmetric SPAKE2

Watson Ladd <> Tue, 27 April 2021 04:04 UTC

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From: Watson Ladd <>
Date: Mon, 26 Apr 2021 21:04:39 -0700
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To: Filippo Valsorda <>
Cc: CFRG <>, Brian Warner <>, "Hao, Feng" <>, Mike Hamburg <>, Benjamin Kaduk <>
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Subject: Re: [CFRG] Symmetric SPAKE2
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On Mon, Apr 26, 2021 at 6:20 PM Filippo Valsorda <> wrote:
> Hi all,
> I am trying to figure out the properties of symmetric SPAKE2, where there is no
> ordering and M = N.
> The only note I can find in draft-irtf-cfrg-spake2-18 is this in Section 5.
>    In addition M and N may be equal to have a symmetric variant.  The
>    security of these variants is examined in [MNVAR].  This variant may
>    not be suitable for protocols that require the messages to be
>    exchanged symmetrically and do not know the exact identity of the
>    parties before the flow begins.
> I interpret "these variants" as the ones with M = N, and "This variant" as the
> "Per-User M and N" one, meaning this paragraph is saying that you can't do
> per-user M and N if M = N, which tracks.
> However, the spec is hardcoding M and N to different values, so it doesn't
> actually seem to allow M = N variants at all. Should that be addressed?

"These variants" is supposed to be M=N where you pick the point or the
per user one.
> I looked at [MNVAR] for a proof of the security of M = N, but I noticed its
> proofs involve UC and a sid. Does that sid have uniqueness requirements that can
> only be satisfied with a full round-trip, like the one involved in the CPace
> proof we discussed a couple weeks ago? In that case I think it wouldn't apply to
> deployed uses of symmetric SPAKE2 like Magic Wormhole.

Look in the Supplemental Material, Game Based Proofs for SPAKE2.

Watson Ladd

Astra mortemque praestare gradatim