Return-Path: X-Original-To: cfrg@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: cfrg@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D5339130DC2 for ; Mon, 11 Feb 2019 05:44:48 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -1.997 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.997 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, MIME_QP_LONG_LINE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id tVo382fOdYpz for ; Mon, 11 Feb 2019 05:44:46 -0800 (PST) Received: from mail-ot1-x332.google.com (mail-ot1-x332.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::332]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D709512008A for ; Mon, 11 Feb 2019 05:44:45 -0800 (PST) Received: by mail-ot1-x332.google.com with SMTP id u16so17454937otk.8 for ; Mon, 11 Feb 2019 05:44:45 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=mime-version:subject:from:in-reply-to:date:cc :content-transfer-encoding:message-id:references:to; bh=A7VeDRsZYFKeIERz1pGtRZ6kYZct1gGTkGjvW5TLVB4=; b=nvrjH94pWpmarP4yFTjZ7wsHiu51sj09jAtgKGlJz97g+lHSw4p7E3wyutzbB8F2vU ocPfO3aMeJv3i8FbhcNmpTPvRwYLbxdQ2wK8fJHk9+d2eA8h3HdXrjJmA7rT/DIr/BIh pNgoFoui4k5AxTFfrDuGrD5rMDTir84yUzfmAjiVBgokiRlqsp9XitEYJYkg0qmaC1vh DwZmxo98gCCifCsa34wc+mvDuDSe4mwf0lnmwhv37Vaf2XVr06mpFgUwMtPKQrOdwkNv di3X6WrGokQt+JswarG4XqGn7hoYsjpebPbQo3y/iXqj7/bvsWvPIZoUrP26dzlaeWf+ z2Xw== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:subject:from:in-reply-to:date:cc :content-transfer-encoding:message-id:references:to; bh=A7VeDRsZYFKeIERz1pGtRZ6kYZct1gGTkGjvW5TLVB4=; b=ix2EfxlnQbiQ6HOM9JF9zxfjDRrrowTwBI3R/sXrEfb2Xr3XvFfqSxjQkEKcZDzXbz T1nyIivg8ufXYH5Sa8fGuXKQf0yRsC4AaT67NSWufK+srP/UJjzPuEBQAlN+SC9X/D/7 zSTF2mGQ1xLvorjHhvu//wcx9NaiWHhK3l5hFwVcacbjYz1jE2Q4wWt2bfndDVL6rCxH 8AyeQqpZk6YBpk0ENKGwtr/8GjTH9X3RhoM4wKwoS1vxD6NB3tp60tmGqoUZZgkRF6wd 0QC0M67ZtLg9U2Prki/gbw/RDTs5iqJi+75ae23ogH6qauTG2W0bSQSe5vIN21C1ii1e a42w== X-Gm-Message-State: AHQUAuaT8bPQvVffLGc8lV00s7zDTzfKVUI+XP3PhbxU5gvMD+3U4y5I 5T68u5ovKyiQaxkzd6DVdTofTsBv/sA= X-Google-Smtp-Source: AHgI3Iap4mq+XmJr7HHk9q75QenX8Zn6fltkvWQMsgrlzSzklNQ+UuqeHfNFLK5+AlD2Dhl8MviHjA== X-Received: by 2002:a9d:6f8d:: with SMTP id h13mr18340166otq.47.1549892684635; Mon, 11 Feb 2019 05:44:44 -0800 (PST) Received: from [192.168.1.141] ([187.153.104.3]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id j88sm1106827otj.47.2019.02.11.05.44.43 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Mon, 11 Feb 2019 05:44:43 -0800 (PST) Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=Apple-Mail-EE5CC1B4-12EB-4DFC-B61C-1BA9B5354CA6 Mime-Version: 1.0 (1.0) From: david wong X-Mailer: iPhone Mail (16D39) In-Reply-To: Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2019 08:44:42 -0500 Cc: CFRG Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Message-Id: References: To: Michael Scott Archived-At: Subject: Re: [Cfrg] BLS standard draft X-BeenThere: cfrg@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Crypto Forum Research Group List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2019 13:44:49 -0000 --Apple-Mail-EE5CC1B4-12EB-4DFC-B61C-1BA9B5354CA6 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable As we have no 100% certainty on if quantum computers that can break crypto w= ill ever be a thing, why should that stop the standardizarion of any algorit= hms? Great work Sergey, David > On Feb 11, 2019, at 6:52 AM, Michael Scott wrote: >=20 > My take on this would be that >=20 > 1) Pairing-based crypto threw open the doors to lots of nice new crypto po= ssibilities, enabling stuff that we couldn't do before >=20 > 2) Gradually post-quantum crypto is catching up and demonstrating capabili= ties that mirror some (but not all) of these achievements >=20 > 3) Post-quantum crypto depends on hard problems that it will take time to d= evelop full confidence in, even in regard to attacks from non-quantum comput= ers >=20 > 4) In the meantime (and that could be quite a long time) it makes perfect s= ense to proceed with the development and standardization of non-quantum safe= methods. >=20 > 5) In the year x out pops a quantum computer. However in the year x-1 out p= opped well-developed and well-understood post-quantum crypto replacements in= which we can have=20 > complete confidence.=20 >=20 >=20 > Everyone is a winner! Well except for the guys who invested in a business p= lan to develop a quantum computer on the basis that it would break all of cr= ypto. >=20 >=20 > Mike Scott >=20 >> On Sun, Feb 10, 2019 at 11:37 PM William Whyte wrote: >> Hi all, >>=20 >> With no intent to cast aspersions on this particular scheme, I'm not sure= that CFRG should be putting a lot of time into non-quantum-safe schemes the= se days unless there's a compelling reason to. >>=20 >> Cheers, >>=20 >> William >>=20 >>> On Sun, Feb 10, 2019 at 5:44 PM Sergey Gorbunov = wrote: >>> Dear Colleagues:=20 >>>=20 >>> We submitted a draft-00 on the BLS signature scheme.=20 >>> We received some preliminary feedback from interested parties, and we pl= an to continue updating it as we receive more.=20 >>> Please take a look.=20 >>> We appreciate any additional feedback!=20 >>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-boneh-bls-signature/ >>>=20 >>> Abstract >>>=20 >>> The BLS signature scheme was introduced by Boneh-Lynn-Shacham in >>> 2001. The signature scheme relies on pairing-friendly curves and >>> supports non-interactive aggregation properties. That is, given a >>> collection of signatures (sigma_1, ..., sigma_n), anyone can produce >>> a short signature (sigma) that authenticates the entire collection. >>> BLS signature scheme is simple, efficient and can be used in a >>> variety of network protocols and systems to compress signatures or >>> certificate chains. This document specifies the BLS signature and >>> the aggregation algorithms.. >>>=20 >>>=20 >>> Regards, >>> Sergey=20 >>> web >>> _______________________________________________ >>> Cfrg mailing list >>> Cfrg@irtf.org >>> https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg >>=20 >>=20 >> --=20 >>=20 >> --- >>=20 >> I may have sent this email out of office hours. I never expect a response= outside yours. >> _______________________________________________ >> Cfrg mailing list >> Cfrg@irtf.org >> https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg > _______________________________________________ > Cfrg mailing list > Cfrg@irtf.org > https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg --Apple-Mail-EE5CC1B4-12EB-4DFC-B61C-1BA9B5354CA6 Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable As we have no 100% certainty on if quantum c= omputers that can break crypto will ever be a thing, why should that stop th= e standardizarion of any algorithms?

Great work Serg= ey,
David

On Feb 11, 2019, at 6:52 AM, Mic= hael Scott <mike.scott@miracl.co= m> wrote:

My take on this would be that
=
1) Pairing-based crypto threw open the doors to lots of nice n= ew crypto possibilities, enabling stuff that we couldn't do before

2) Gradually post-quantum crypto is catching up and demonstr= ating capabilities that mirror some (but not all) of these achievements

3) Post-quantum crypto depends on hard problems that it= will take time to develop full confidence in, even in regard to attacks fro= m non-quantum computers

4) In the meantime (and tha= t could be quite a long time) it makes perfect sense to proceed with the dev= elopment and standardization of non-quantum safe methods.

5) In the year x out pops a quantum computer. However in the year x-1= out popped well-developed and well-understood post-quantum crypto replaceme= nts in which we can have 
complete confidence. 


Everyone is a winner! Well except for the gu= ys who invested in a business plan to develop a quantum computer on the basi= s that it would break all of crypto.


Mike Scott

On Sun, Feb 10, 2019 at 11:37 PM William Whyte <wwhyte@onboardsecurity.com>= wrote:
Hi all,

With no intent to cast aspersions on this p= articular scheme, I'm not sure that CFRG should be putting a lot of time int= o non-quantum-safe schemes these days unless there's a compelling reason to.=

Cheers,

William

On Su= n, Feb 10, 2019 at 5:44 PM Sergey Gorbunov <sgorbunov@uwaterloo.ca> wrote:
Dear Colleagues: 

We submitted a= draft-00 on the BLS signature scheme. 
We received some prel= iminary feedback from interested parties, and we plan to continue updating i= t as we receive more. 
Please take a look. 
We= appreciate any additional feedback! 

<= div>Abstract

   The BLS signature scheme w= as introduced by Boneh-Lynn-Shacham in
   2001.  Th= e signature scheme relies on pairing-friendly curves and
  &n= bsp;supports non-interactive aggregation properties.  That is, given a<= /div>
   collection of signatures (sigma_1, ..., sigma_n), any= one can produce
   a short signature (sigma) that authen= ticates the entire collection.
   BLS signature scheme i= s simple, efficient and can be used in a
   variety of n= etwork protocols and systems to compress signatures or
  &nbs= p;certificate chains.  This document specifies the BLS signature and
   the aggregation algorithms..

<= br>
=
Regards,
Sergey 
_______________________________________________
Cfrg mailing list
Cfrg@irtf.org
https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg


--
<= div dir=3D"ltr">

---

I may have s= ent this email out of office hours. I never expect a response outside yours.=
_______________________________________________
Cfrg mailing list
Cfrg@irtf.org
https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
________= _______________________________________
Cfrg mailing list
Cfrg@irtf.org
<= span>https://www.irtf= .org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
= --Apple-Mail-EE5CC1B4-12EB-4DFC-B61C-1BA9B5354CA6--