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Re: [Cfrg] Second RGLC on "AES-GCM-SIV"

Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com> Sat, 20 January 2018 20:01 UTC

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From: Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 20 Jan 2018 12:01:24 -0800
Message-ID: <CAHOTMVKr93AKiifyuBxGApjhZWaRcRURv64_T=UQf4_HqUAi+A@mail.gmail.com>
To: Stefano Tessaro <tessaro@cs.ucsb.edu>
Cc: Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>, Adam Langley <agl@imperialviolet.org>, Yehuda Lindell <Yehuda.Lindell@biu.ac.il>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Second RGLC on "AES-GCM-SIV"
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On Sat, Jan 20, 2018 at 11:26 AM, Stefano Tessaro <tessaro@cs.ucsb.edu>
wrote:

> In addition to this, one of the points highlighted by our multi-user
> analysis (linked above) is that there is a great security benefit in
> the multi-user/multi-key setting if we can ensure that each particular
> nonce value is re-used by a small number of users only. This is of
> course true if nonces are chosen with sufficient randomness. (Our
> security bounds show how security degrades as nonces are re-used by
> more users.) This is particularly important when using 128-bit keys,
> less relevant with longer (256 bits) keys.


Would it be useful to include some text similar to the beginning of the
"Shifting Language" section from https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/189.pdf ?

The paper defining MRAE [54] never suggested that nonce-reuse was OK; it
> said that an MRAE scheme must do “as well as possible with whatever IV is
> provided”


-- 
Tony Arcieri

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