[Cfrg] I-D Action: draft-irtf-cfrg-randomness-improvements-10.txt
internet-drafts@ietf.org Mon, 17 February 2020 20:29 UTC
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Subject: [Cfrg] I-D Action: draft-irtf-cfrg-randomness-improvements-10.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories. This draft is a work item of the Crypto Forum RG of the IRTF. Title : Randomness Improvements for Security Protocols Authors : Cas Cremers Luke Garratt Stanislav Smyshlyaev Nick Sullivan Christopher A. Wood Filename : draft-irtf-cfrg-randomness-improvements-10.txt Pages : 10 Date : 2020-02-17 Abstract: Randomness is a crucial ingredient for TLS and related security protocols. Weak or predictable "cryptographically-strong" pseudorandom number generators (CSPRNGs) can be abused or exploited for malicious purposes. The Dual EC random number backdoor and Debian bugs are relevant examples of this problem. An initial entropy source that seeds a CSPRNG might be weak or broken as well, which can also lead to critical and systemic security problems. This document describes a way for security protocol participants to augment their CSPRNGs using long-term private keys. This improves randomness from broken or otherwise subverted CSPRNGs. This document is a product of the Crypto Forum Research Group (CFRG). The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-irtf-cfrg-randomness-improvements/ There are also htmlized versions available at: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-randomness-improvements-10 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-randomness-improvements-10 A diff from the previous version is available at: https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-irtf-cfrg-randomness-improvements-10 Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org. Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at: ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
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