Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security levels (ends on February 17th)
"Stanislav V. Smyshlyaev" <smyshsv@gmail.com> Wed, 11 February 2015 15:40 UTC
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Date: Wed, 11 Feb 2015 18:40:48 +0300
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From: "Stanislav V. Smyshlyaev" <smyshsv@gmail.com>
To: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security levels (ends on February 17th)
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Dear Daniel, thank you for the link: indeed, the draft GOST R 34.10-2012 has been already finalized and now is RFC 7091. In Russia 512-bit curves are not still widely used for everyday document processing, but a lot of cryptography software and hardware already support 512-bit level – I would say that it is possible to add a novel curve, but it doesn't seem realistic to change standard (with its constraints) or all implementations (most of them can't support curves with p>2^{512} or q>2^{512}). And at least for these reasons I don't think that our Federal Agency on Technical Regulating and Metrology could expand possible set for q. Thank you very much for your attention. Regards, Stanislav Smyshlyaev 2015-02-11 18:24 GMT+03:00 Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>: > On Wed 2015-02-11 02:02:26 -0500, Stanislav V. Smyshlyaev wrote: > > > there is a draft of the new Russian digital signature standard GOST R > > 34.10-2012 in English: > > https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-dolmatov-gost34102012-00. > > It looks to me like this is now RFC 7091. > > > Also the previous standard (there are only two major differences > > between standards: distinct hash functions and available key sizes > > the previous standard was translated in english as RFC 5832, i think. > here are the sections about parameters restrictions: > > https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7091#section-5.2 > > https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5832#section-5.2 > > As i read them, the constraints are in two places: > > a) the fixed-bit-length "Binary vectors" key representations (section > 5.3) of either exactly 512 bits or 1024 bits, which appear to be > concatenations of big-endian values of X and Y coordinates. > > b) equation (9): > > | m = nq, n belongs to Z, n >= 1 > | (9) > | 2^254 < q < 2^256 or 2^508 < q < 2^512 > > > Constraint (a) does seem to rule out 521-bit values which would cause > interoperability issues with systems that have adopted this standard, > but only constraint (b) rules out in-between choices like Goldilocks. > > The main change from 2001 to 2012 is the addition of the 512-bit level > to this standard; how many systems support the 512-bit level with > arbitrary curves today? what sort of work needs to be done to enable > those systems to use a novel curve? Do implementations actually verify > equation (9) dynamically when confronted with a new curve, or could > points from an intermediate curve left-padded with zeros satisfy the > binary vector representation requirement and move forward with these > implementations? > > Could the Federal Agency on Technical Regulating and Metrology consider > issuing another revision add a new level (either intermediate or above > 512) if there was a broader consensus about it? > > --dkg >
- [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security levels … Alexey Melnikov
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Torsten Schütze
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Dan Brown
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Nguyen Dr., Kim
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Stanislav V. Smyshlyaev
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Watson Ladd
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Aaron Zauner
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Christoph Anton Mitterer
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Dan Brown
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Paul Hoffman
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Adam Langley
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Yoav Nir
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Stephen Farrell
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Salz, Rich
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Tony Arcieri
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Daniel Kahn Gillmor
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Mike Hamburg
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Yoav Nir
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Kurt Roeckx
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Alyssa Rowan
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Mike Hamburg
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Tony Arcieri
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Станислав Смышляев
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Andy Lutomirski
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… James Cloos
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Yoav Nir
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Damien Miller
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… James Cloos
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Mike Jones
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Benjamin Beurdouche
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Daniel Kahn Gillmor
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… David Leon Gil
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Dan Harkins
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Olafur Gudmundsson
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Bindhunadhava
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Aaron Zauner
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Stanislav V. Smyshlyaev
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Manger, James
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Russ Housley
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Russ Housley
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Brian Smith
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Paterson, Kenny
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Paterson, Kenny
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Yoav Nir
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Daniel Kahn Gillmor
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Stanislav V. Smyshlyaev
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Watson Ladd
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Dan Brown
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Annie Yousar
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Russ Housley
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Andrey Jivsov
- [Cfrg] Why I think 256-level is a bad idea [Was: … Ilari Liusvaara
- Re: [Cfrg] Why I think 256-level is a bad idea [W… Adam Langley
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Michael Scott
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Simon Josefsson
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… _MiW
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Alexey Melnikov
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Olafur Gudmundsson
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Alexey Melnikov
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Brian Smith
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Paterson, Kenny
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Joseph Salowey
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Watson Ladd
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Alexey Melnikov
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Kurt Roeckx
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Nex6|Bill