[Cfrg] Jianfei He's No Objection on draft-irtf-cfrg-randomness-improvements-12: (with COMMENT)

Jianfei He via Datatracker <noreply@ietf.org> Wed, 27 May 2020 01:48 UTC

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Cc: draft-irtf-cfrg-randomness-improvements@ietf.org, cfrg-chairs@ietf.org, cfrg@ietf.org, Alexey Melnikov <alexey.melnikov@isode.com>, alexey.melnikov@isode.com
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Date: Tue, 26 May 2020 18:48:47 -0700
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Subject: [Cfrg] Jianfei He's No Objection on draft-irtf-cfrg-randomness-improvements-12: (with COMMENT)
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Jianfei He has entered the following ballot position for
draft-irtf-cfrg-randomness-improvements-12: No Objection

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The document is generally clear in its objective and methods. One comment is on
"the length  M" at the 2nd paragraph in section 3 "Randomness Wrapper". It is
not explicitly described how to decide this value.

In RFC 5869, it is stated as below:
"Ideally, the salt value is a random (or pseudorandom) string of the length
HashLen.  Yet, even a salt value of less quality (shorter in size or with
limited entropy) may still make a significant contribution to the security of
the output keying material"

But to the specific application in this draft, it is not sure M chould be
almost arbitary, or M =< L, or there are more specific suggestions from best