[Cfrg] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-harkins-pkex-05.txt
Dan Harkins <dharkins@lounge.org> Thu, 25 January 2018 00:45 UTC
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From: Dan Harkins <dharkins@lounge.org>
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Subject: [Cfrg] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-harkins-pkex-05.txt
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Hello, I've updated the PKEX draft based on comments received from a security review. There was a little uptick in interest in this document coming out of Singapore and I would still like it to be adopted as a RG work item. This draft addresses one of the PAKE applications from RFC 8125, so this is in CFRG's bailiwick. To remind everyone (and avoid more "what is PKEX?" emails) this draft describes a way to gain trust in a "raw" public key and bind that key to an identity. This fills the gap in some key agreement schemes that use "raw" public keys but always say they are exchange in a manner outside the scope of the document. Please take a look, and send comments. regards, Dan. -------- Forwarded Message -------- A new version of I-D, draft-harkins-pkex-05.txt has been successfully submitted by Dan Harkins and posted to the IETF repository. Name: draft-harkins-pkex Revision: 05 Title: Public Key Exchange Document date: 2018-01-24 Group: Individual Submission Pages: 32 URL: https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-harkins-pkex-05.txt Status: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-harkins-pkex/ Htmlized: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-harkins-pkex-05 Htmlized: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-harkins-pkex-05 Diff: https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-harkins-pkex-05 Abstract: This memo describes a password-authenticated protocol to allow two devices to exchange "raw" (uncertified) public keys and establish trust that the keys belong to their respective identities. Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org. The IETF Secretariat