Re: [Cfrg] I-D Action: draft-irtf-cfrg-gcmsiv-04.txt

Adam Langley <> Thu, 23 February 2017 16:32 UTC

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From: Adam Langley <>
Date: Thu, 23 Feb 2017 08:32:12 -0800
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Cc: Yehuda Lindell <>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] I-D Action: draft-irtf-cfrg-gcmsiv-04.txt
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On Thu, Feb 23, 2017 at 8:28 AM,  <> wrote:
> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
> This draft is a work item of the Crypto Forum of the IETF.
>         Title           : AES-GCM-SIV: Nonce Misuse-Resistant Authenticated Encryption
>         Authors         : Shay Gueron
>                           Adam Langley
>                           Yehuda Lindell
>         Filename        : draft-irtf-cfrg-gcmsiv-04.txt
>         Pages           : 46
>         Date            : 2017-02-23

Dear all,

Revision 04 of the AES-GCM-SIV draft
( has just been
published. This contains only tidy-ups from revision 03—no substantive
changes have been made.

Most importantly, it now references a paper
( by Shay and Yehuda in which they
give precise security bounds for AES-GCM-SIV. Specifically I'd like to
highlight to the group theorem six (which gives those bounds) and
section 5.3 (which gives concrete values of those bounds at a number
of locations in the configuration space).

In light of previous discussions in the working group, section seven
includes some remarks about the meaning of nonce-misuse resistance.

(Comments about the paper, including sightings of typos, are welcome
to be sent to us directly; no need to clutter this list with them.)