[Cfrg] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-barnes-cfrg-hpke-00.txt

Raphael Robert <raphael@wire.com> Mon, 28 January 2019 15:17 UTC

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Subject: [Cfrg] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-barnes-cfrg-hpke-00.txt
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Hey Richard,

The proposal seems rather generic to me and I like the channel binding to the responder's public key.

A few comments:

 - There seems to be some terminology mismatch between (receiver, responder and recipient) also possibly between (initiator and sender).
 - I suppose the ciphersuites are inspired by TLS. I'd like to raise the question if blake2 wouldn't make sense for the non-NIST ones.
 - The points brought up in Appendix A are important. In particular, I think it would be worthwhile investigating if a general KEM mechanism wouldn't be the better choice, potentially paving the way for PQ primitives.



> Hi CFRG folks,
> I've just posted this draft that Karthik and I have been working on.  You
> may recall my having mentioned it at the IETF in Bangkok; it took us a bit
> longer than expected to get our ducks in a row :)
> The idea here is to write a clean, easy-to-use spec for hybrid public-key
> encryption.  (We're using the name "ECIES", but as the draft notes, the
> idea is clearly more general.)  This primitive has come up in IETF work on
> MLS and ESNI [0][1], and in several other protocols, e.g., through the NaCl
> "box" API [2].  The hope here is to have a single spec that unifies these
> ideas and can be the target of formal verification.
> I admit that there's a little bit of XKCD#927 here [3], but I think there's
> good work to do here in terms of addressing some more modern use cases
> (e.g., streaming / multiple encryptions from a single DH) and possibly
> enabling better post-quantum support by generalizing to KEM instead of DH.
> This is obviously still at -00 quality, but we wanted to go ahead and ask
> whether this was a topic of interest to folks in CFRG.
> Thanks,
> --Richard
> [0]
> https://github.com/mlswg/mls-protocol/blob/master/draft-ietf-mls-protocol.md#direct-paths <https://github.com/mlswg/mls-protocol/blob/master/draft-ietf-mls-protocol.md#direct-paths>
> [1] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-esni-02#section-5.1 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-esni-02#section-5.1>
> [2] https://nacl.cr.yp.to/box.html <https://nacl.cr.yp.to/box.html>
> [3] https://xkcd.com/927/ <https://xkcd.com/927/>
> ---------- Forwarded message ---------
> From: <internet-drafts@ietf.org> <mailto:internet-drafts@ietf.org&gt>;
> Date: Fri, Jan 18, 2019 at 6:08 PM
> Subject: New Version Notification for draft-barnes-cfrg-hpke-00.txt
> To: Richard L. Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx> <mailto:rlb@ipv.sx&gt>;, Karthikeyan Bhargavan <
> karthikeyan.bhargavan@inria.fr> <mailto:karthikeyan.bhargavan@inria.fr&gt>;
> A new version of I-D, draft-barnes-cfrg-hpke-00.txt
> has been successfully submitted by Richard L. Barnes and posted to the
> IETF repository.
> Name:           draft-barnes-cfrg-hpke
> Revision:       00
> Title:          Hybrid Public Key Encryption
> Document date:  2019-01-18
> Group:          Individual Submission
> Pages:          10
> URL:
> https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-barnes-cfrg-hpke-00.txt <https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-barnes-cfrg-hpke-00.txt>
> Status:         https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-barnes-cfrg-hpke/ <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-barnes-cfrg-hpke/>
> Htmlized:       https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-barnes-cfrg-hpke-00 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-barnes-cfrg-hpke-00>
> Htmlized:       https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-barnes-cfrg-hpke <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-barnes-cfrg-hpke>
> Abstract:
>    This document describes a scheme for hybrid public-key encryption
>    (HPKE).  This scheme provides authenticated public key encryption of
>    arbitrary-sized plaintexts for a recipient public key.  HPKE works
>    for any Diffie-Hellman group and has a strong security proof.  We
>    provide instantiations of the scheme using standard and efficient
>    primitives.
> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org <https://tools.ietf.org/>.
> The IETF Secretariat