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Re: [Cfrg] ECC reboot

Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Thu, 23 October 2014 17:49 UTC

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From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2014 10:49:17 -0700
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To: Alyssa Rowan <akr@akr.io>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] ECC reboot
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On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 10:41 AM, Alyssa Rowan <akr@akr.io> wrote:
>> How long do you think it would take to make an HSM that supports
>> our choice?
>
> Depends: from what I've seen a few HSMs are flexible enough to run
> whatever we choose. (I'll refrain from discussion of specific vendors:
> it is for them to speak up if they wish.)

This seems like a good time to point out that Intel SGX is coming
soon.  With SGX, some performance-critical HSM applications could be
replaced with hardware-assisted secure *software* enclaves on
supported Intel chips.

For this application, the relevant factors will be software speed
(because it's just x86 software), freedom from timing attacks, and
freedom from secrets being leaked in memory access patterns.

Some users might require certification, but there will be no
additional hardware development effort whatsoever to add new curves.

--Andy

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