Re: [Cfrg] FIPS or equivalent approvals

[Phillip Hallam-Baker <[e-mail]>]

On Tue, Jul 29, 2014 at 1:59 PM, Alyssa Rowan <[e-mail]> wrote:
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> On 29/07/2014 16:03, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
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>> trustworthy HSMs
>
> A mammoth problem, and not one I believe CFRG is really in a position
> to solve.
>
> Given EDGEHILL and BULLRUN and related concerns about the CESG/FIPS
> validation processes, I feel a HSM/smartcard/token design actually
> worthy of third-party trust would need:
>
> • Open, transparent, public open-source design, from software down as
>   far as practical - right down past the mask to the gate/process level
>   if possible;
>
> • To be publicly and independently tested, verified and verifiable;
>
> • To be practically immune to all known or reasonably speculated
>   attacks


It isn't just the US up to these things.

Before the PRISM disclosures I spent a lot of time with some people
whose names would be familiar looking at the problem of stopping them
doing unto the US what we now know they were doing unto others
(including US companies).

Supply chain is a hard problem. But not being able to guarantee that
the crypto has not been bongoed by Fort Meade does not mean that I
want to accept the risk of being able to extract a valuable root key.
That would be a major personal safety risk.