Re: [Cfrg] Schnorr just as vulnerable to bad RNG
Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> Fri, 25 July 2014 21:16 UTC
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Date: Fri, 25 Jul 2014 22:16:41 +0100
From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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To: Dan Brown <dbrown@certicom.com>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
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Archived-At: http://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/cfrg/kvUQoSJyfLkCBg2VYrbOfNO-KT0
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Schnorr just as vulnerable to bad RNG
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Hiya, On 25/07/14 14:17, Dan Brown wrote: > Procedurally, I think signature algorithm choice, and method to > generate ephemerals is a CFRG issue, not a SAAG issue. No. IETF WGs can choose to ask CFRG for advice and, when given, that's very welcome and seriously considered. CFRG, nor the IRTF more generally, don't get to determine IETF consensus. S.
- [Cfrg] Schnorr just as vulnerable to bad RNG Dan Brown
- Re: [Cfrg] Schnorr just as vulnerable to bad RNG Bodo Moeller
- Re: [Cfrg] Schnorr just as vulnerable to bad RNG Rene Struik
- Re: [Cfrg] Schnorr just as vulnerable to bad RNG Bodo Moeller
- Re: [Cfrg] Schnorr just as vulnerable to bad RNG Michael Hamburg
- Re: [Cfrg] Schnorr just as vulnerable to bad RNG Stephen Farrell
- Re: [Cfrg] Schnorr just as vulnerable to bad RNG David Jacobson
- Re: [Cfrg] Schnorr just as vulnerable to bad RNG Sandy Harris