[Cfrg] My thoughts on randomized signature generation

Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> Tue, 05 May 2020 12:36 UTC

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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 5 May 2020 08:35:56 -0400
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Subject: [Cfrg] My thoughts on randomized signature generation
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Dear participants,

I apologize for the long delay between the virtual meeting and this
email. I'm writing to expand upon my opposition at the mike to
distinguishing between interoperable signatures based on the method of
generation.

My opposition is rooted in the following facts: the signature
generation method doesn't introduce any incompatibility with existing
verfiers, and the existing installed verifiers expect the already
allocated codepoints. A new system using randomized generation that
doesn't use the existing codepoints will thus be incompatible. It
would of course be possible to avoid this, and the right way is simply
to use the existing codepoints rather then implement the less secure
generation method.

Sincerely,
Watson Ladd