Re: [Cfrg] [saag] New draft: Hashed Password Exchange

"Blumenthal, Uri - 0668 - MITLL" <uri@ll.mit.edu> Thu, 05 January 2012 16:28 UTC

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From: "Blumenthal, Uri - 0668 - MITLL" <uri@ll.mit.edu>
To: Steven Bellovin <smb@cs.columbia.edu>
Date: Thu, 5 Jan 2012 11:28:12 -0500
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] [saag] New draft: Hashed Password Exchange
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Cc: "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>, "saag@ietf.org" <saag@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] [saag] New draft: Hashed Password Exchange
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Steve,

How would you compare your proposed localizing-by-URI approach with
localizing-by-host (or by "SNMP engine") approach proposed in RFC 3414
http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc3414/ ?

Some questions to consider.

You propose "localization" by service - i.e., by hostname + port. How many
passwords per user would a server store? How critical is your requirement
that "no two [effective] `passwords for different services [on the same
host] should be the same for the same user"?  A benefit of not localizing
based on the whole service would be the ability for a multi-named server ­
based on some rules that are out of scope for this email ­ choose the
"dominant" name and localize users' passwords to it, thus storing one
password per user on this server; avoiding the potential ambiguity that Joe
Touch pointed out.

Is HMAC an overkill in this case, considering that inverting a decent hash
didn't work even for the long-deprecated MD4 (we seem to worry here about
non-invertibility/one-way-ness, not collision resistance)? Or did you choose
it because it's the best keyed hash construct we have?  Note that the
brute-force attacks would be the same for both plain hash and HMAC (with
HMAC offering one more hash run per iteration).

Regarding salt ­ couldn't it be used on the server only? Treating the
"localized password" as the pre-salted password in the original Unix scheme,
then salting it before comparison? Obviously this is not the method to use
in protocols that employ the password derivative as a cryptographic keyŠ

Oh, and since this proposal seems to be addressing the same problem in a
somewhat similar way ­ perhaps it would make sense to include a reference to
RFC 3414 (section 2.6 Key Localization Algorithm)? :)

Tnx!
-- 
Regards,
Uri      uri@ll.mit.edu