Re: [Cfrg] I-D Action: draft-irtf-cfrg-gcmsiv-04.txt

"David McGrew (mcgrew)" <mcgrew@cisco.com> Fri, 24 February 2017 12:40 UTC

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From: "David McGrew (mcgrew)" <mcgrew@cisco.com>
To: Adam Langley <agl@imperialviolet.org>, "cfrg@ietf.org" <cfrg@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] I-D Action: draft-irtf-cfrg-gcmsiv-04.txt
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Date: Fri, 24 Feb 2017 12:40:49 +0000
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Cc: Yehuda Lindell <yehuda.lindell@biu.ac.il>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] I-D Action: draft-irtf-cfrg-gcmsiv-04.txt
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Hi Adam,

One quick comment: the draft doesn’t request that IANA create registry entries for the algos that it defines (as per https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5116#section-6); we surely want to include them in the registry.

best

David

p.s. - a nit that I noticed in the Ack section: Mosna&#269;ek






On 2/23/17, 11:32 AM, "Cfrg on behalf of Adam Langley" <cfrg-bounces@irtf.org on behalf of agl@imperialviolet.org> wrote:

>On Thu, Feb 23, 2017 at 8:28 AM,  <internet-drafts@ietf.org> wrote:
>> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
>> This draft is a work item of the Crypto Forum of the IETF.
>>
>>         Title           : AES-GCM-SIV: Nonce Misuse-Resistant Authenticated Encryption
>>         Authors         : Shay Gueron
>>                           Adam Langley
>>                           Yehuda Lindell
>>         Filename        : draft-irtf-cfrg-gcmsiv-04.txt
>>         Pages           : 46
>>         Date            : 2017-02-23
>
>Dear all,
>
>Revision 04 of the AES-GCM-SIV draft
>(https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-gcmsiv-04) has just been
>published. This contains only tidy-ups from revision 03—no substantive
>changes have been made.
>
>Most importantly, it now references a paper
>(https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/168) by Shay and Yehuda in which they
>give precise security bounds for AES-GCM-SIV. Specifically I'd like to
>highlight to the group theorem six (which gives those bounds) and
>section 5.3 (which gives concrete values of those bounds at a number
>of locations in the configuration space).
>
>In light of previous discussions in the working group, section seven
>includes some remarks about the meaning of nonce-misuse resistance.
>
>(Comments about the paper, including sightings of typos, are welcome
>to be sent to us directly; no need to clutter this list with them.)
>
>
>Cheers
>
>AGL
>
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