Re: [Cfrg] Trusting government certifications of cryptography
Michael Hamburg <mike@shiftleft.org> Tue, 07 October 2014 16:55 UTC
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From: Michael Hamburg <mike@shiftleft.org>
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Date: Tue, 07 Oct 2014 09:55:33 -0700
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To: Dirk Feldhusen <dirk.feldhusen@src-gmbh.de>
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Cc: "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>, "D. J. Bernstein" <djb@cr.yp.to>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Trusting government certifications of cryptography
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> On Oct 7, 2014, at 9:08 AM, Dirk Feldhusen <dirk.feldhusen@src-gmbh.de> wrote: > To exclude the possibilty of power or EM side channel you need the > assumption that the attacker has no physical access to the device. > As I understand Torsten the main problem here are special primes which > are harder to secure against such side channel leakage. Are they actually harder to secure (eg, requiring new countermeasures), or just slower on hardware which doesn’t accelerate the special prime (eg, by requiring longer blinding factors)? — Mike
- [Cfrg] Hardware requirements for elliptic curves Joppe Bos
- Re: [Cfrg] Hardware requirements for elliptic cur… Alyssa Rowan
- Re: [Cfrg] Hardware requirements for elliptic cur… Michael Hamburg
- Re: [Cfrg] Hardware requirements for elliptic cur… Johannes Merkle
- Re: [Cfrg] Hardware requirements for elliptic cur… Michael Hamburg
- Re: [Cfrg] Hardware requirements for elliptic cur… Alyssa Rowan
- Re: [Cfrg] Hardware requirements for elliptic cur… Andy Lutomirski
- Re: [Cfrg] Hardware requirements for elliptic cur… Robert Ransom
- Re: [Cfrg] Hardware requirements for elliptic cur… Lochter, Manfred
- Re: [Cfrg] Hardware requirements for elliptic cur… Johannes Merkle
- Re: [Cfrg] Hardware requirements for elliptic cur… Wieland.Fischer
- Re: [Cfrg] Hardware requirements for elliptic cur… Alyssa Rowan
- Re: [Cfrg] Hardware requirements for elliptic cur… Watson Ladd
- Re: [Cfrg] Hardware requirements for elliptic cur… Patrick Georgi
- Re: [Cfrg] Hardware requirements for elliptic cur… Paul Lambert
- Re: [Cfrg] Hardware requirements for elliptic cur… Torsten Schuetze
- Re: [Cfrg] Hardware requirements for elliptic cur… Torsten Schuetze
- Re: [Cfrg] Hardware requirements for elliptic cur… Andy Lutomirski
- Re: [Cfrg] Hardware requirements for elliptic cur… Mike Hamburg
- Re: [Cfrg] Hardware requirements for elliptic cur… Torsten Schuetze
- Re: [Cfrg] Hardware requirements for elliptic cur… Watson Ladd
- Re: [Cfrg] Hardware requirements for elliptic cur… Mike Hamburg
- Re: [Cfrg] Hardware requirements for elliptic cur… Alyssa Rowan
- Re: [Cfrg] Hardware requirements for elliptic cur… Lochter, Manfred
- Re: [Cfrg] Hardware requirements for elliptic cur… Alyssa Rowan
- Re: [Cfrg] Hardware requirements for elliptic cur… Dirk Feldhusen
- Re: [Cfrg] Hardware requirements for elliptic cur… Lochter, Manfred
- Re: [Cfrg] Hardware requirements for elliptic cur… Ilari Liusvaara
- Re: [Cfrg] Hardware requirements for elliptic cur… Watson Ladd
- Re: [Cfrg] Hardware requirements for elliptic cur… Peter Gutmann
- [Cfrg] Trusting government certifications of cryp… D. J. Bernstein
- Re: [Cfrg] Trusting government certifications of … David Jacobson
- Re: [Cfrg] Trusting government certifications of … Torsten Schütze
- Re: [Cfrg] Trusting government certifications of … Watson Ladd
- Re: [Cfrg] Trusting government certifications of … Dirk Feldhusen
- Re: [Cfrg] Trusting government certifications of … Michael Hamburg
- Re: [Cfrg] Trusting government certifications of … Dirk Feldhusen
- Re: [Cfrg] Trusting government certifications of … Lochter, Manfred
- Re: [Cfrg] Trusting government certifications of … Mike Hamburg
- Re: [Cfrg] Primes vs. hardware side channels David Leon Gil
- [Cfrg] Primes vs. hardware side channels D. J. Bernstein
- Re: [Cfrg] Primes vs. hardware side channels Alyssa Rowan