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Re: [Cfrg] What groups to use for Diffie Hellman?

Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@hallambaker.com> Mon, 31 October 2016 21:24 UTC

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From: Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@hallambaker.com>
Date: Mon, 31 Oct 2016 17:24:52 -0400
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To: Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>
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Cc: jonas weber <jonasweber86@yandex.com>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>, Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] What groups to use for Diffie Hellman?
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On Mon, Oct 31, 2016 at 3:57 PM, Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:

>
> On 31 Oct 2016, at 20:45, Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@hallambaker.com>
> wrote:
>
> > Based on my conversations with NSA folk, the governing doctrine is
> 'NOBUS' nobody but us. Introducing a weakness that only the NSA could
> exploit with hidden knowledge nobody else could discover independently is
> one thing. Developing a system with a hole anyone can find if they look
> long enough is not acceptable.
>
> Whatever else he may have accomplished, Edward Snowden proved that NSA
> hidden knowledge can and does get unhidden. At least to people who failed
> to learn that from PFC Manning.
>
> So it’s best not to deploy a group that only the NSA can break, even if
> you are not concerned about the NSA monitoring your data. The next Snowden
> can make it so that the people that you are concerned about will also be
> doing it.


​Well it came up in a response to my complaint about BULLRUN...​

​​

​I think that point is now appreciated. And not just because of Snowden.
There was also the hacking tools dump that appears to have been finger
trouble without ​actual criminal intent.

It is useful to enumerate and distinguish the attacks we are avoiding and
the ones we are not. Especially when we have no way to avoid some pitfalls.
There is no deterministic procedure that is going to guarantee strong
parameters against unknown attacks. We have no way of knowing which
parameters are strong.


​We can nail down backdoor free and eliminate the NOBUS attacks. That does
not prevent some sociopath smurfing a set of weak parameters. But if they
did, the US govt would likely be among the biggest victims as a result.​

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