Re: [Cfrg] FW: New Version Notification for draft-mattsson-cfrg-det-sigs-with-noise-02.txt

"Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL" <uri@ll.mit.edu> Wed, 11 March 2020 16:38 UTC

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From: "Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL" <uri@ll.mit.edu>
To: John Mattsson <john.mattsson=40ericsson.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] FW: New Version Notification for draft-mattsson-cfrg-det-sigs-with-noise-02.txt
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Date: Wed, 11 Mar 2020 16:38:22 +0000
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] FW: New Version Notification for draft-mattsson-cfrg-det-sigs-with-noise-02.txt
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Perfect, *thank you!*

On 3/11/20, 12:15 PM, "Cfrg on behalf of John Mattsson" <cfrg-bounces@irtf.org on behalf of john.mattsson=40ericsson.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:

    Dear CFRG,
    
    After the comments on the list I submitted a new version. The changes since -00 are
    
    - As suggested Quynh Dang and Uri Blumenthal, the new version replaces the XOR construction with concatenation and places the random value before the message.
    - As suggested [SBBDS17] and Uri Blumenthal, the new version implements the additional countermeasure to pad with zeroes so that so that the first block is composed only of the hashed private key and the random value, but not the message.
    - As suggested by Tony Arcieri, the terminology "noise" could be confusing and has been changes to "additional randomness"
    - Some more text on the construction and benefits with the construction.
    - Reduced and slightly rewritten discussion section (to be removed in the future)
    
    Cheers,
    John
    
    -----Original Message-----
    From: "internet-drafts@ietf.org" <internet-drafts@ietf.org>
    Date: Wednesday, 11 March 2020 at 16:11
    To: John Mattsson <john.mattsson@ericsson.com>om>, John Mattsson <john.mattsson@ericsson.com>om>, Sini Ruohomaa <sini.ruohomaa@ericsson.com>om>, Erik Thormarker <erik.thormarker@ericsson.com>
    Subject: New Version Notification for draft-mattsson-cfrg-det-sigs-with-noise-02.txt
    
        
        A new version of I-D, draft-mattsson-cfrg-det-sigs-with-noise-02.txt
        has been successfully submitted by =?utf-8?q?John_Preu=C3=9F_Mattsson?= and posted to the
        IETF repository.
        
        Name:		draft-mattsson-cfrg-det-sigs-with-noise
        Revision:	02
        Title:		Deterministic ECDSA and EdDSA Signatures with Additional Randomness
        Document date:	2020-03-11
        Group:		Individual Submission
        Pages:		13
        URL:            https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-mattsson-cfrg-det-sigs-with-noise-02.txt
        Status:         https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-mattsson-cfrg-det-sigs-with-noise/
        Htmlized:       https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-mattsson-cfrg-det-sigs-with-noise-02
        Htmlized:       https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-mattsson-cfrg-det-sigs-with-noise
        Diff:           https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-mattsson-cfrg-det-sigs-with-noise-02
        
        Abstract:
           Deterministic elliptic-curve signatures such as deterministic ECDSA
           and EdDSA have gained popularity over randomized ECDSA as their
           security do not depend on a source of high-quality randomness.
           Recent research has however found that implementations of these
           signature algorithms may be vulnerable to certain side-channel and
           fault injection attacks due to their determinism.  One countermeasure
           to such attacks is to re-add randomness to the otherwise
           deterministic calculation of the per-message secret number.  This
           document updates RFC 6979 and RFC 8032 to recommend constructions
           with additional randomness for deployments where side-channel attacks
           and fault injection attacks are a concern.
        
                                                                                          
        
        
        Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
        until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
        
        The IETF Secretariat
        
        
        
    
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