Re: [Cfrg] how can CFRG improve cryptography in the Internet?

[Rob Stradling <[e-mail]>]

On 07/02/14 19:28, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
<snip>
> Another approach could be to design cryptographic software with built-in
> expiration dates for *every* algorithm.  The software could check the
> current date, and would know when a given algorithm was due to expire,
> and warn the user that their communications security is in doubt if they
> are using an expired algorithm (or refuse to use the expired algorithm).
>   Software updates could either (a) deploy new algorithms with later
> expiration dates, or (b) indicate that we have more confidence in an
> existing algorithm, thereby extending its current expiration date.

No-longer-deemed-secure algorithms aren't the only security problems 
facing out-of-date cryptographic software.  So why not go one step 
further and make the cryptographic software itself expire?

(Yes, IE6, I'm looking at you!)

-- 
Rob Stradling
Senior Research & Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online