Re: [Cfrg] matching AES security
Alyssa Rowan <akr@akr.io> Fri, 01 August 2014 13:04 UTC
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From: Alyssa Rowan <akr@akr.io>
Date: Fri, 01 Aug 2014 14:03:56 +0100
To: cfrg@irtf.org
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] matching AES security
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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 On 1 August 2014 09:53:50 BST, Alex Elsayed <eternaleye@gmail.com> wrote: >Matching bit-lengths has value not in the _technicals_, but because it's a Schelling point. I think recommendations need to be made on solid technical and practical grounds, not fluffy marketing and psychological ones. Users wouldn't typically know Rho work factor is actually lower than they thought at 0.886√ℓ, or might just think the 521-bit curves just typoed 512. Not to mention the eye-roll I know most of us feel when we see "military-grade" crypto marketed (probably with clearly-visible penguins), and the number of times we've all seen people copy-paste SSL configs. We need fast, strong cryptosystems. But I don't think specific aesthetics of the bit lengths of those matter outside their security and performance effects, and I don't think it'll have an appreciable effect on adoption either way. - -- /akr -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: APG v1.1.1 iQI3BAEBCgAhBQJT25A7GhxBbHlzc2EgUm93YW4gPGFrckBha3IuaW8+AAoJEOyE jtkWi2t6SowP/iOVodqSSs78w3CJ+ESjZan0TgNOnxPcSz0r8ZhoVqCHPlpqYh44 RuMNcxiEHAM5zxJ3sD2ofoZ9p9QiGtvLDv113L58AQKtyEnvWgQe+EWL0QjFPPOL oAmLzy9bWsPEdsOlbvf/CtRkYogB+226fwwPrQ6kVcp3oyaj2J4ft/UFmGogWX4z OcxMnDlgfx1MnsqR3k7Akibx8dUCMIHsGJEfRSgOSDI+a58geYtX1i8eUq8rvS0U TcXTMXSv89xZ8csHUK4v9xS320aSbBocXc5doeVoU4pqMfZ1tC6Vj04eXzqy8CMZ /qqZnKDoQfX3sVAxdVF/7K/7E/qWDC07SL5QUv5cw6driaLSBn327wXVulO+wSNJ bK333Wd0y4EkCxDYBKAQUJRxiWOnOLmIxpGvBjJJlxSH1trPVJ7lZoiD3MDuCWRZ NKf8J76+KDh8WQSfPv29TEEq1e7ZuWiuFyZeXP+31oroWi40hnHjd+iRGz4YEQ/8 pjz0mDBHMuR9B+2gcXkyvr5djSwTGQvTBx8EUF1FbjATrvxPf9hiHmNFqLA39JEQ N8SIpeFbQby8hE0hOAunvp0a7yiyzw588srcvegRzy+R7VYVXAacNEGfR4SXo5iA LegVEC4X4tCmSNIM7KuztTPwEvhnlQO3mqiOCZCAAiMloQas94fOTGvc =3GMF -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
- [Cfrg] matching AES security D. J. Bernstein
- Re: [Cfrg] matching AES security Robert Moskowitz
- Re: [Cfrg] matching AES security Natanael
- Re: [Cfrg] matching AES security Tanja Lange
- Re: [Cfrg] matching AES security Paul Lambert
- Re: [Cfrg] matching AES security Benjamin Black
- Re: [Cfrg] matching AES security Blumenthal, Uri - 0558 - MITLL
- Re: [Cfrg] matching AES security Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: [Cfrg] matching AES security Watson Ladd
- Re: [Cfrg] matching AES security Blumenthal, Uri - 0558 - MITLL
- Re: [Cfrg] matching AES security Michael Hamburg
- Re: [Cfrg] matching AES security Andrey Jivsov
- Re: [Cfrg] matching AES security Andy Lutomirski
- Re: [Cfrg] matching AES security Andy Lutomirski
- Re: [Cfrg] matching AES security Michael Hamburg
- Re: [Cfrg] matching AES security Sandy Harris
- Re: [Cfrg] matching AES security James Cloos
- Re: [Cfrg] matching AES security Blumenthal, Uri - 0558 - MITLL
- Re: [Cfrg] matching AES security Nico Williams
- Re: [Cfrg] matching AES security Blumenthal, Uri - 0558 - MITLL
- Re: [Cfrg] matching AES security Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: [Cfrg] matching AES security Watson Ladd
- Re: [Cfrg] matching AES security Johannes Merkle
- Re: [Cfrg] matching AES security Robert Moskowitz
- Re: [Cfrg] matching AES security Brian Smith
- Re: [Cfrg] matching AES security Peter Gutmann
- Re: [Cfrg] matching AES security Andrey Jivsov
- Re: [Cfrg] matching AES security Watson Ladd
- Re: [Cfrg] matching AES security Alex Elsayed
- Re: [Cfrg] matching AES security Peter Gutmann
- Re: [Cfrg] matching AES security Alyssa Rowan
- Re: [Cfrg] matching AES security Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: [Cfrg] matching AES security Dan Brown
- Re: [Cfrg] matching AES security Dan Harkins
- Re: [Cfrg] matching AES security Ilari Liusvaara
- Re: [Cfrg] matching AES security D. J. Bernstein