Re: [Cfrg] MAY use specified curves

"David Leon Gil" <coruus@gmail.com> Wed, 10 September 2014 01:07 UTC

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From: "David Leon Gil" <coruus@gmail.com>
To: "Daniel Kahn Gillmor" <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
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Cc: Dan Brown <dbrown@certicom.com>, cfrg@irtf.org
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] MAY use specified curves
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i'd say that custom groups or curves are at best a SHOULD NOT, unless
there are some very clear guidelines on how to evaluate them at
connection time to determine what approximate security level they provide.

​


​To expand on this, I think that the CFRG should provide a method for evaluating curves for safety for IETF WGs to use.​

A number of people have mentioned applications with specific criteria that may not be satisfied by curves that are good for TLS. This matter is -- unlike performance considerations, or cipher-equivalent-security-level minutiae -- very clearly in-scope for CFRG.