[CGA-EXT] RV: New Version Notification for draft-ietf-csi-proxy-send-05

Alberto García <alberto@it.uc3m.es> Tue, 28 September 2010 15:07 UTC

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Subject: [CGA-EXT] RV: New Version Notification for draft-ietf-csi-proxy-send-05
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Hi,
I have posted a new version of draft-ietf-csi-proxy-send, version -05 which
addresses some comments made by the IESG (including the 2 KeyPurposeId's
introduced in draft-ietf-csi-send-cert-07)

Regards,
Alberto

-----Mensaje original-----
De: IETF I-D Submission Tool [mailto:idsubmission@ietf.org] 
Enviado el: martes, 28 de septiembre de 2010 17:00
Para: alberto@it.uc3m.es
CC: suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com; julienl@qualcomm.com;
marco.bonola@gmail.com
Asunto: New Version Notification for draft-ietf-csi-proxy-send-05 


A new version of I-D, draft-ietf-csi-proxy-send-05.txt has been successfully
submitted by Alberto Garcia-Martinez and posted to the IETF repository.

Filename:	 draft-ietf-csi-proxy-send
Revision:	 05
Title:		 Secure Proxy ND Support for SEND
Creation_date:	 2010-09-28
WG ID:		 csi
Number_of_pages: 29

Abstract:
Secure Neighbor Discovery (SEND) specifies a method for securing
Neighbor Discovery (ND) signaling against specific threats.  As
defined today, SEND assumes that the node sending a ND message is the
owner of the address from which the message is sent and/or posses a
key which authorizes the node to act as a router, so that it is in
possession of the private key or keys used to generate the digital
signature on each message.  This means that the Proxy ND signaling
performed by nodes that do not possess knowledge of the address
owner's private key and/or knowledge of a router's key cannot be
secured using SEND.  This document extends the current SEND
specification in order to secure Proxy ND operation.
 



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