Re: [CGA-EXT] Comment draft-ietf-csi-hash-threat-08.txt
Ana Kukec <anchie@fer.hr> Sat, 06 March 2010 18:29 UTC
Return-Path: <anchie@fer.hr>
X-Original-To: cga-ext@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: cga-ext@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6CEDD3A8FFB for <cga-ext@core3.amsl.com>; Sat, 6 Mar 2010 10:29:03 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.599
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id o0IgiMeTq96u for <cga-ext@core3.amsl.com>; Sat, 6 Mar 2010 10:29:02 -0800 (PST)
Received: from munja.zvne.fer.hr (munja.zvne.fer.hr [161.53.66.248]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 661D33A900B for <CGA-EXT@ietf.org>; Sat, 6 Mar 2010 10:29:01 -0800 (PST)
Received: from sluga.fer.hr ([161.53.66.244]) by munja.zvne.fer.hr with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.3959); Sat, 6 Mar 2010 19:29:04 +0100
Received: from anchie-MacBook.lan ([93.139.10.247]) by sluga.fer.hr with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.3959); Sat, 6 Mar 2010 19:29:02 +0100
Message-ID: <4B929EEC.6080005@fer.hr>
Date: Sat, 06 Mar 2010 19:29:00 +0100
From: Ana Kukec <anchie@fer.hr>
User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.23 (Macintosh/20090812)
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: Roque Gagliano <roque.ietf@gmail.com>
References: <5f70d8c91003060933v4360e177u1dbf156e6c1e055e@mail.gmail.com>
In-Reply-To: <5f70d8c91003060933v4360e177u1dbf156e6c1e055e@mail.gmail.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="ISO-8859-1"; format="flowed"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-OriginalArrivalTime: 06 Mar 2010 18:29:03.0026 (UTC) FILETIME=[E599F920:01CABD5A]
Cc: CGA-EXT@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [CGA-EXT] Comment draft-ietf-csi-hash-threat-08.txt
X-BeenThere: cga-ext@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: CGA and SeND Extensions <cga-ext.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cga-ext>, <mailto:cga-ext-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cga-ext>
List-Post: <mailto:cga-ext@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:cga-ext-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cga-ext>, <mailto:cga-ext-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 06 Mar 2010 18:29:03 -0000
Roque Gagliano wrote: > Moreover, the cert. profile document particularly requests that names > should be "meaningless" in RPKI. This is to avoid any sort of legal > issues. Just checked again RPKI cert profile (architecture) draft. There is definitely no MUST on not using human readable fields. It's simply that RPKI certs are authorization and not authentication certificates, so the recommendation is not be descriptive when it comes to identities, but rather choose effective names that will make the linkage with the existing database records easier. When analyzing possible attacks, we must consider that there might be meaningful identities. Actually, from the attacker's point of view, even the identity that easies the linkage with the database might be for some reason meaningful and possibly predictable. After all, as long as it is not completely random, there is a chance that the attack will take less effort then the brute force attack. Additionally, we can put the identity fields on the side. There are other human readable fields -- for example, validity periods. > > All in all, I believe we should not take for granted that the > distinguished name field for either the subject or the issuer of a > SEND certificate should always be human readable. > There is no assumption in the draft that any of identity fields is always human readable. Ana