Re: [cicm] Use Cases
"Cottrell Jr., James R." <jxc@mitre.org> Mon, 19 September 2011 14:58 UTC
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From: "Cottrell Jr., James R." <jxc@mitre.org>
To: CICM Discussion List <cicm@ietf.org>
Date: Mon, 19 Sep 2011 11:00:29 -0400
Thread-Topic: [cicm] Use Cases
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Subject: Re: [cicm] Use Cases
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John, While a gov.secret type radio has two security domains, plaintext side containing sensitive/classified and ciphertext side containing usually unclassified (encrypted) information, this isn’t normally MLS because the processing of each domain is performed by independent hardware. Use of a hypervisor to host the plaintext, cryptographic and ciphertext domains would be an example of a MLS implementation. MLS is typically used to describe processing multiple classification levels of information on a single hardware processor, https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Multilevel_security The example of a product having a single plaintext port usually would be at a single security level. A single plaintext port could support MLS if the Operating environment servicing the port supports MLS, possibly hypervisors, and the protocols and hardware for the single port support data separation and/or data labeling. The systems feeding/receiving data over the port would have to support this MLS solution. Jim Cottrell From: cicm-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:cicm-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Davidson, John A. Sent: Monday, September 19, 2011 12:03 AM To: cicm@ietf.org Subject: Re: [cicm] Use Cases Lev wrote, > FYI: By adding this use case, I'm not saying that CICM needs to support > Multiple Levels of Security (MLS) and/or Multiple Independent Levels of > Security (MILS), but I am saying we shouldn't do anything to prevent someone > from using it those configurations, if they so choose. Without a formal definition of High Assurance, I use the customary connotation that it enforces a policy with near certainty, for cases where gov. secrets are being protected (by gov directive). When we have a radio that handles gov classified traffic, it is necessarily MLS mode, (MILS is a subset of MLS) and should enforce a policy for non-disclosure of classified and use high assurance mechanisms. There is no other requirement I know of for high assurance. The radio must have unclassified IF/RF processes (e.g. modem) and it must have classified processes (e.g. baseband user interfaces). Even a single level classified radio will necessarily operate in MLS mode as a system. …and needs Hema’s containers. So, I am not sure what realistic configuration of a CICM radio, presumably containing a crypto(?), with an antenna on one connector and a classified userdata port on another connector, does NOT need to support MLS. I guess one is when the userdata has no secrecy properties, but for that do we need a radio with a crypto? Guess I am splitting hairs (and pulling teeth!). Sure, CICM should work for a non-MLS radio, but I don’t understand what purpose it serves to acknowledge it. Is it a political correctness thing? John ----- Original Message ----- From: cicm-bounces@ietf.org <cicm-bounces@ietf.org> To: CICM Discussion List <cicm@ietf.org> Sent: Sun Sep 18 07:46:36 2011 Subject: Re: [cicm] Use Cases Hema, On 2011-09-14 11:52, Hema Krishnamurthy wrote: > 1. There is mention of MLS in the list below, but have you considered > "containers" for each security level in an MLS system? On 2011-09-14 12:23, John Davidson wrote: > IMHO, the answer to 1. is "not really," because to address this in a sound way > excludes a lot of unsound things that legacy systems are accustomed to doing; > and expect of CICM. On 2011-09-13 15:10, John Fitton wrote: > An API does not and should not determine the underlying security architecture > compliance to security policy. The API should be 100% agnostic to an MLS, > MILS, MSLS or SLS security architecture. I was trying to be very careful with this use case, but I went too far. Recall, that on 2011-09-08 14:14, I wrote: > FYI: By adding this use case, I'm not saying that CICM needs to support > Multiple Levels of Security (MLS) and/or Multiple Independent Levels of > Security (MILS), but I am saying we shouldn't do anything to prevent someone > from using it those configurations, if they so choose. > See http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-lanz-cicm-lm-01#section-1.4 The point of the use case is to say "CICM should not interfere with systems in which there are multiple levels of security" (but it doesn't do anything to help either). Therefore, I believe that this use cases any and all "container" configurations in which there are multiple security levels. > 2. Key exchange - Is it going to cover all types - IPSec, SSL/TLS/DTLS? The use case is generic--that CICM should support secure key exchange; the analysis will evaluate the feasibility of using those protocols with the CICM model. > 3. How about voice over IP use case? Part of it would fall under the > networking arena, but there would be some specifics pertaining to VoIP - like > support of SRTP. Perhaps I'm misunderstanding something, but is there some fundamental difference between this use case and the regular two-domain use case? > 4. I forget, does CICM support the ability to write down SADs into the crypto > module? Assuming SAD is "Security Association Database", then, no, there aren't currently specific CICM API commands for managing the SAD as an entity unto itself. Creating channels will have effects on the SAD, but CICM doesn't expose that level of detail to the application. Lev _______________________________________________ cicm mailing list cicm@ietf.org<mailto:cicm@ietf.org> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cicm
- [cicm] Use Cases Novikov, Lev
- Re: [cicm] Use Cases Kevin W. Wall
- Re: [cicm] Use Cases Davidson, John A.
- Re: [cicm] Use Cases Novikov, Lev
- Re: [cicm] Use Cases Kevin W. Wall
- Re: [cicm] Use Cases Novikov, Lev
- Re: [cicm] Use Cases Krishnamurthy, Hema - ES
- Re: [cicm] Use Cases Davidson, John A.
- Re: [cicm] Use Cases Fitton, John
- Re: [cicm] Use Cases Novikov, Lev
- Re: [cicm] Use Cases Davidson, John A.
- Re: [cicm] Use Cases Cottrell Jr., James R.
- Re: [cicm] Use Cases Davidson, John A.
- Re: [cicm] Use Cases Fitton, John
- Re: [cicm] Use Cases Fitton, John
- Re: [cicm] Use Cases Davidson, John A.
- Re: [cicm] Use Cases Davidson, John A.
- Re: [cicm] Use Cases Fitton, John