Re: [cicm] Use Cases

"Kevin W. Wall" <kevin.w.wall@gmail.com> Tue, 30 August 2011 15:33 UTC

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Date: Tue, 30 Aug 2011 11:35:14 -0400
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From: "Kevin W. Wall" <kevin.w.wall@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [cicm] Use Cases
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On Tue, Aug 30, 2011 at 11:04 AM, Novikov, Lev <lnovikov@mitre.org> wrote:
> Kevin,
>
> On 2011-08-26 16:34, Lev Novikov wrote:
>> 2. Traditional data-in-transit and -at-reset case (cf. PKCS#11)
>
> On 2011-08-26 18:25, Kevin Wall wrote:
>> I presume that you meant 'at-rest' rather than 'at-reset' here?
>
> Yes. Hopefully we're not resetting the data when we store it.

Yes; that would be bad. ;-)

> On 2011-08-26 18:25, Kevin Wall wrote:
>> What are your assumptions about crypto keys? Are you assuming that
>> 2 parties have already met and shared keys (probably out of band)?
>> If not, then I could see maybe use cases involving secure key
>> exchange. However, I suspect that is considered out of scope.
>
> I don't think the model should assume that keys were pre-shared. For
> example, CICM currently supports negotiating an asymmetric key which
> results in an ephemeral symmetric key.
>
> See: http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-lanz-cicm-cm-01#section-8
>
> Therefore, adding a use case for a secure key exchange seems
> reasonable (assuming I understood your proposed case correctly).

I didn't realize that CICM supported key negotiation, but if it does,
I agree that there should be a use case for secure key exchange
to describe it.

-kevin
-- 
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