Re: [cicm] comments on CICM
"David A. McGrew" <david.a.mcgrew@mindspring.com> Wed, 03 August 2011 22:02 UTC
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From: "David A. McGrew" <david.a.mcgrew@mindspring.com>
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Subject: Re: [cicm] comments on CICM
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Hi Jim, http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-peck-suiteb-dtls-srtp-00 requires AES- GCM, and is presumably intended for VoIP, though it does not specifically mention VoIP. Suite B RFCs have shown a clear preference for GCM, though some other modes are allowed (as transitional in TLS, and within IKE but not ESP). David On Aug 3, 2011, at 2:05 PM, Cottrell Jr., James R. wrote: > Hema, > > Thanks. > > Not all Suite B products will be IPsec. I believe Harris has a > Suite B tactical radio. For protection of voice traffic, I wouldn't > think that they used AES-GCM. > > Jim Cottrell > > -----Original Message----- > From: cicm-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:cicm-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf > Of Krishnamurthy, Hema - ES > Sent: Wednesday, August 03, 2011 10:52 AM > To: CICM Discussion List > Subject: Re: [cicm] comments on CICM > > http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4869 lists AES-GCM as part of Suite B. > > -----Original Message----- > From: cicm-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:cicm-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf > Of Cottrell Jr., James R. > Sent: Wednesday, August 03, 2011 7:49 AM > To: CICM Discussion List > Subject: Re: [cicm] comments on CICM > > David McGrew, > > In your email you stated " Considering that AES-GCM is required for > Suite B, and the Suite B RFCs > all cite RFC 5116, the lack of AEAD support appears problematic" > > Can you please provide an authoritative document stating this > requirement? > > Thanks, > > Jim Cottrell > > -----Original Message----- > From: cicm-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:cicm-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf > Of Novikov, Lev > Sent: Wednesday, August 03, 2011 10:03 AM > To: CICM Discussion List (cicm@ietf.org) > Subject: [cicm] FW: comments on CICM > > FYI: Below is an insightful email from David McGrew that does not > appear to have made it to the mailing list nor was it held for > moderation so the list never saw it. > > Lev > > -----Original Message----- > From: David A. McGrew [mailto:david.a.mcgrew@mindspring.com] > Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2011 14:39 > To: cicm@ietf.org; Lanz, Dan; Novikov, Lev > Subject: comments on CICM > > Hi Lev and Daniel, > > I skimmed the CICM documents and have several comments. > > It seems that the major goal for CICM is multi-vendor support. > Worthwhile goal, but what crypto hardware vendors whose products > support IETF standards are participating in this effort? > > RFC 5116 defines a standard interface to Authenticated Encryption with > Associated Data (AEAD) algorithms, which is used by TLS 1.2, SSH, > SRTP, IKE, and SMIME, and is backwards compatible with ESP. The AEAD > interface is simple (two defined messages, four inputs and one output > each), and AEAD is widely regarded as the state of the art in security > and efficiency (including both OCB and GCM, for instance). It appears > that CICM is not compatible with this interface, in which case it > would be a real step backwards. (If CICM does support AEAD, it is not > clear to me how it does. Am I missing something?) > > CICM is intended for use in a high assurance crypto module. > Considering that AES-GCM is required for Suite B, and the Suite B RFCs > all cite RFC 5116, the lack of AEAD support appears problematic. > > The use cases for which CICM is intended are those where > "cryptographic transformation of data initiated in one security > domain with the result made available in another security domain"; > three cases are given, two of which are HAIPE. So clearly the CICM > design has been driven by high assurance requirements that are highly > security conscious and not publicly available. My question here is: > how will the CICM design make implementations of IETF security > protocols better? If CICM is tightly bound to non-public protocols, > it will not have much relevance to the IETF. On the other hand, if > there is a document that shows how a high assurance design approach > can be used in an IETF standard like TLS or IPsec, that could be > valuable. It could be a good contribution to the IETF to provide > implementation criteria or design approaches that are applicable to > internet standards. I think there would be a good amount of interest > in this sort of work, and in fact I would be very happy to see that > sort of document show up in IRTF CFRG. > > An important nit: MD5 is used as an example on pg 24 of draft-lanz- > cicm-02. It has been deprecated by RFC 6151; I encourage that a > different hash be used as an example. > > regards, > > David > > _______________________________________________ > cicm mailing list > cicm@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cicm > > _______________________________________________ > cicm mailing list > cicm@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cicm > > This e-mail and any files transmitted with it may be proprietary and > are intended solely for the use of the individual or entity to whom > they are addressed. If you have received this e-mail in error please > notify the sender. > Please note that any views or opinions presented in this e-mail are > solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of > ITT Corporation. The recipient should check this e-mail and any > attachments for the presence of viruses. ITT accepts no liability > for any damage caused by any virus transmitted by this e-mail. > _______________________________________________ > cicm mailing list > cicm@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cicm > _______________________________________________ > cicm mailing list > cicm@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cicm
- [cicm] FW: comments on CICM Novikov, Lev
- Re: [cicm] FW: comments on CICM Davidson, John A.
- Re: [cicm] comments on CICM Cottrell Jr., James R.
- Re: [cicm] comments on CICM Krishnamurthy, Hema - ES
- Re: [cicm] comments on CICM David A. McGrew
- Re: [cicm] comments on CICM Cottrell Jr., James R.
- Re: [cicm] comments on CICM David A. McGrew
- Re: [cicm] FW: comments on CICM David A. McGrew
- Re: [cicm] FW: comments on CICM Davidson, John A.
- Re: [cicm] FW: comments on CICM jmitola
- Re: [cicm] FW: comments on CICM Alfonso De Gregorio